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15 January 1946

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in

SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME VII

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(August-September, 1943)

15 January 1946

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(August and September 1943)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is one of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

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longitude 130° E were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This does not

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
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mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and efficiently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.

Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.

Red line - tonnage sunk
Black line - GZ translations

CHART A



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Though United States submarines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on ULTRA information ... (131237 NCR 1231).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ComIntOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific,

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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume

outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during August and September, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

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B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

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CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 810

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 445

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 4
2. Submarine not in area..... 100
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 86
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 223
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 5
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 20
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 7

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 354

1. Results of the Contact

- A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 120
- (1) Sunk..... 33
 - (2) Damaged..... 56
 - (3) No perceptible damage..... 16
 - (4) Missed..... 15

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked..... 234

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 65
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 16
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 9
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 3
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 137
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 4

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to charts, Jan-Oct)

- A. Positive..... 112
- B. Probable..... 11
- C. Possible..... 24

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 11

*The number of potential targets in each Case is

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derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch. If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a larger ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several" ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee e.g., Case 23 of July or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH 18/1836 May
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOWESPAC
PREC: DEFERRED

SUPER SECRET X ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES
BASING WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER
DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS
SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL
COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES.

B. FROM: CINCPAC 18/1836 May
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE

PASS COMINCH 181837 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSUBPAC 13/0935 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM
. FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

.....
..... NEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS COMMAND X SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

August 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 68

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 33

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 0
2. Submarine not in area..... 6
3. Submarine pursuing other targets.... 8
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 17
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine 0
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
7. Information cancelled as incorrect.. 1

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 35

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 13

- (1) Sunk..... 2
- (2) Damaged..... 8
- (3) No perceptible damage... 0
- (4) Missed..... 3

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked. 22

- (1) Unfavorable position of submarine..... 1
- (2) Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
- (3) Submarine attacked by escorts..... 0
- (4) Target showed hospital ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other targets..... 20
- (6) Target not worth torpedo expenditure.... 0

2. Quality of the Contact (according to Chart-August)

- A. Positive..... 5
- B. Probable..... 1
- C. Possible..... 5

III. Number of Potential Targets for which the Results are Unknown..... 0

* Convoy of unknown number of ships has
been considered as but one target.

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1.	01-0749	U.S.S. Steelhead	Convoy including one auxiliary car- rier and several battleships to be at: 10-23N, 147-57E at 0600(GCT) on August 4, and 8-15N, 149-40E at 1500(GCT) on August 4.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. A convoy of 3 capital ships, an XCV and 5 destroyers was sighted at 08-17N, 149-54E at 1532 (GCT) on August 4. At 1644 (GCT) two hits were scored on the XCV.
		U.S.S. Tullibee		Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Tullibee made radar contact with a convoy at 1313 (GCT) on August 4 at position 8N, 149E. No attack was made due to the unfavorable posi- tion of the submarine and the confusion caused by the large number of targets.
		U.S.S. Porv		None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Porv was north of the prescribed area and en route to Johnston Island on these dates.

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
2.	01-0831	U.S.S. <u>Paddle</u>	Convoy to be at the None following positions: at 0300 (GCT) on August 1, 28N-134E; at 0300 (GCT) on August 2, 25-10N, 134E; at 0300 (GCT) on August 3, 22-30N, 133-00E; will pass through 24-05N, 134-00E between last two positions and change course at that point. ComSubPac promised later positions on this for the <u>Minwo</u> . (See Case 7 - Chart)		ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Paddle</u> was in this area but did not contact the convoy. Visibility was limited by bad weather.

3.	01-0943	U.S.S. <u>Paddle</u>	One maru to be at the None following positions at 0300 (GCT) on August 2, 4, 6 and 8: 5-20N, 148-10E; 11-40N, 142-00E; 21-00N, 139-05E and 30-50N, 137-50E.		ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. A DD was sighted at 30-15N, 134-32E on August 9 at 0343 (GCT), but the <u>Paddle</u> was unable to close for an attack.
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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
4.	02-0723	<u>U.S.S. Seadragon</u>	Convoys to be at: 07-42N, 160-34E at 0300(GCT) on August 4; 08-07N, 163-22E at 0300 (GCT) on August 5; 08-35N, 166-10E at 0300(GCT) on August 6.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Sea-</u> dragon damaged one freighter of a 4-ship convoy at 7-04N, 160-45E at 0714(GCT) August 4. Later at 1459(GCT) August 6 the submarine attacked and probably sank two more ships of the con- voy in position 8-49N, 167-23E.

ComSubPac dispatch
received. The Paddle
was patrolling, but
did not contact the
submarine.

5.	02-0834	<u>U.S.S. Paddle</u>	German submarine to None be at the following positions at the times given 0000(GCT) 26-44N, 132-30E, and 2300(GCT) 31-20N, 132-30E on August 4. Additional information sent that the German sub of 02-0834 will be met by an escort vessel.	None
	04-0840			

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No. ComSubPac
Operational
Dispatches
(Date-Time)

Submarine Type, No. of Ships, Contacts
Address(es) Position(s) Made with
Target(s)

Results of contact(s)

5. (Cont.)

U.S.S.
Pollack

None

ComSubPac dispatch received. Two 5,000-ton AK's were sighted at 29-03N, 141-12E at 2350(GCT) on August 5. While the Pollack was giving chase to these two vessels, she sighted a three-ship convoy and changed to the more worthwhile target. An attack was conducted and it is quite possible that one of the freighters in the convoy was sunk. This, however, was not the Ultra target.

U.S.S.
Tullibee

None

ComSubPac dispatch received. For the period August 5-10 the submarine was conducting a patrol across Saipan-Truk traffic routes.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Ultra Target(s)	Result of Contact(s)
6.	02-1024	<u>U.S.S. Tullibee</u>	KYOKUTO Maru and escort to leave Truk at 2000(GCT) on August 2 and to be at 09-40N, 147-34E at the same time the following day.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. No entry in log for these dates.
		<u>U.S.S. Pogy</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pogy was enroute to Johnston Island for refueling these dates. No contacts were made.
		<u>U.S.S. Steelhead</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steelhead sank the TAIEYO MARU contacted on August 1 (L) with PC escort at 11-20N, 153-30E.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
7.	03-0957	<u>U.S.S. Tullibee</u>	Merchantman to join escort at 0300(GCT) on August 5 at 7-15N, 149-00E and arrives at south entrance (Truk) at 0700(GCT) the next day.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tullibee made radar contact with a large ship at 8-28N, 149- 22E at 1402(GCT) on August 4 but due to bad weather the ship was never actually sighted or attacked. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steel- head was busy at- tacking a convoy at 08-17N, 149-54E.
		<u>U.S.S. Steelhead</u>		None	
(a) (This target is a continuation of Case 2. Ed. Note.)					
		<u>U.S.S. Hingo</u>	Convoy to be at the following positions at 0300(GCT) August 6, 7, 8: 14-35N, 133-45E; 12-00N, 132-45E; 9-35N, 132-30E.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Hingo at 2252(GCT) August 5. in position 13-44N, 133-22E attacked three freighters (with destroyer es- cort) and damaged one of the freighters. No contact was made with the empty tanker.
			An empty tanker to be at 11-10N, 146-40E and 15-10N, 132-20E at 0300(GCT) on August 4 and 5.	None	

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(a)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
8.	03-1832	<u>U.S.S. Porky</u>	Carrier OTAKA to be at 8-48N, 155-00E at 0740 (GCT) on August 4 and 20-37N, 153-47E at 0300 (GCT) on August 6. (Lat. for August 6 is doubtful.)	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Porky</u> was enroute to Johnston Island for fuel these days.
		<u>U.S.S. Pike</u>		Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. A converted carrier (KATUUA class same as OTAKA) es- corted by a FUBUKI class destroyer at 0308 (GCT) on August 6 at 21-04N, 153-31E. The carrier was damaged but not sunk. ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> was experiencing bad weather these dates and made no contacts.
		<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>		None	

See Case 19 (Chart)
for further informa-
tion on the Otaka.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
9.	03-1837	<u>U.S.S. Skipjack</u>	Convoy to be at the following positions on August 4, 5, and 6 at 0300(GCT): 32-39N, 139-42 E; 29-26N, 140-02 E; and 26-14N, 140-21 E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Patrolling approaches to Tokyo Bay (this area) but made no contacts.
		<u>U.S.S. Pollack</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. A convoy of 3 freighters and 2 escorts was sighted at 29-10N, 141E on August 6 at 0136(GCT); see Case 14.
		<u>U.S.S. Sailfish</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Sailfish</u> was patrolling in this area but did not contact the convoy.

See Chart VII,
Case 47 for
earlier informa-
tion on same
convoy.

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
10.	04-1757	U.S.S. <u>Mingo</u>	Convey to be at the following positions at 0300(GCT) on August 5 and 6: 10- 40N, 135-40E; 16-00N, 137-30E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch was received. On August 5, the <u>Mingo</u> was heading north for a possible contact near 15N. The fol- lowing day it was engaged with a four- ship convoy at 13-44N, 133-22E. No contact with the Ultra target was reported.

11.	05-0620	U.S.S. <u>Silverides</u>	Tankers to be at 07-15N, 148-50E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Silverides</u> was in this area but made no contact with "the tankers".
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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacta Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
12.	05-0725	U.S.S. Seadragon	Convoy to pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on August 5, 6, 7 and 8: 9-15N, 166-20E; 8-50N, 162-35E; 8-18N, 157-20E; and 8-55N, 155-26E to pass through the fol- lowing points between positions given above: 9-30N, 165-32E; 9-30N, 163-38E; 7-25N, 160-05E and 8-55N, 158-52E. One ship to be at 8-48N, 168-05E at 1900(GCT) on August 5 and 8-48N, 167- 36E at 2200(GCT) on August 5.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The sea- dragon was in this area but did not sight either Ultra target. A convoy was sighted in Kwajalein lagoon on August 8 but no at- tack was made pos- sibly because of the heavy air escort.

(a)

13.	05-0812	U.S.S. Whale	Merchantman (type unknown) or convoy to be at the fol- lowing positions at 0300(GCT) on August 5, 6, 7 and 8:	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The whale was in a storm on August 5 and 6 and headed for Saipan on August 7. On August
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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
13. (Cont.)			20-47N, 146-40E; 25-25N, 143-15E; 30-05N, 141-40E and 34-40N, 139-55E.		7 at 2045(GCT) at 24- 17N, 142-50E an AK and an AMAGARI class DD escort were sighted. The AK was sunk. See Case 14 on Chart.
(a)		<u>U.S.S. Pollack</u>		None	
		<u>U.S.S. Pike</u>	Convoy to be at 22- 55N, 148-25E and 26-20N, 147-00E at 0300(GCT) on August 7 and 8.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. There was no contact.
14.	05-0833	<u>U.S.S. Pollack</u>	Three-ship convoy to be at the fol- lowing positions at 0300(GCT) on August 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10: 31-25N, 140-00E; 29-00N, 141-00E; 25-55N, 142-15E; 22-40N, 143-30E; 19-25N, 144-40E and 16-00N, 145-30E.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. Three vessels were sighted at 0136(GCT) on August 6 at 29-10N, 141-00E. One freighter was hit, possibly sunk.
		<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>		None	See Case 13 on Chart.

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August 1943

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
15. 05-1759	<u>U.S.S. Tullibee</u>	Two tankers to be at 06-35N, 145-35E and 07-15N, 148-50E at 0300(GCT) on August 5 and 6.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Patrolling in this area, the <u>Tullibee</u> did not con- tact the two tankers.
	<u>U.S.S. Steelhead</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Steel- head</u> was attacking a 9-ship convoy at 8N, 150E on August 5. No contacts were re- ported on August 6.
	<u>U.S.S. Silverides</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Silver- ides</u> was pursuing a large AK on August 6; first sighted at 3-47N 152-38, and made no contact with the Ultra target.
16. 05-1853	<u>U.S.S. Salmon</u>	Three or four sub- marines to be at 50-45N, 156-10E at 0700(GCT) on August 5. On August 7 the position will be 45-40N, 142-00E. Exact route unknown.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Salmon</u> was engaged in sinking a freighter these dates.

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
17.	06-0814	U.S.S. Paddle	Convoy to be at 25-20N, 135-30E at 0300(GCT) on August 8 will pass through 28-00N, 135-30E and be at 30-05N, 134-40E at 0300(GCT) on August 9 and from there to 31-30N, 134-00E.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Paddle sighted a small ship at 30-15N, 137-32E at 0343(GCT) on August 9. This is a possible contact with the convoy's escort.
(a)		U.S.S. Pike	Convoy to be at the following positions at 0300(GCT) on August 7, 8 and 9: 23-31N, 141-51E; 21-05N, 144-04E and 18-22N, 145-20E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pike searched for the convoy but made no contacts.
18.	06-0821	U.S.S. Skipjack	Convoy to be at 32-25N, 143-05E at 0300(GCT) on August 5 and 34-45N, 139-50E at the same time on the following day.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skipjack was in this area but did not contact other convoy.
(a)			Convoy to be at 30-05N, 141-40E and 34-05N, 139-55E at 0300(GCT) on August 7 and 8.		

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
19.			(This is a continuation of Case 8. Id. Note.)		
07-0819		U.S.S. Whale	Carrier on direct route to Yokosuka or Chichijima damaged by Pike.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> at 2045(GCT) on August 7 contacted a large freighter (con- verted to naval auxiliary) and escort at 24-17N, 142-50E. The freighter was sunk.
08-0851		U.S.S. <u>Skipjack</u>	<u>Kasuga</u> class carrier None damaged by <u>Pike</u> , prior to being hit was due at 34-10N, 141-50E at 2000(GCT) on August 8 to arrive at Yokosuka at 1200(GCT) on August 9.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Skip-</u> <u>jack</u> from August 7-11 patrolled the approaches to Tokyo Bay. No contact was reported with the Ultra target.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
20.	07-0819	<u>U.S.S. Tullibee</u>	Three merchantmen to be at the fol- lowing positions at 0300(GCT) on August 10, 11, 12 and 13: 15-14N, 145-37E; 12-24N, 147-10E; 09-35N, 148-48E and 07-12N, 150-30E.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. Three AK's and an escort were sighted and attacked at 11-43N, 147-34E at 0406(GCT) on August 10 and either the same ship or another of the same setup again on August 14 at 0218 (GCT) at 9-26N, 147- 26E. No perceptible damage was inflicted.
		<u>U.S.S. Steelhead</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steel- head was returning to Pearl these dates.
21.	12-0926	<u>U.S.S. Swordfish</u>	Slow convoy ap- proaching from ar- southeast will ar- rive at 17-16N, 134-30E at dawn on August 14. (Possible transmission error in first posi- tion. Ed. Note.)	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Swordfish</u> was pa- trolling in this area but did not sight the convoy.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Contacts		Results of Contact(s)
			Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Made with Target(s)	
22.	13-0847	U.S.S. <u>Beadraron</u>	Convoy departs main port of Kwajalein for Truk on August 13 (no time given).	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Sea-</u> <u>dragon</u> was patrolling this area but did not sight the convoy.
23.	20-0930	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>	Escort leaving <u>Tunny</u> area (Palau) at 0700(GCT) on August 20 to rendezvous with a convoy at 8-22N, 134-23E at 2000 (GCT) on the same date.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> sighted a six-ship convoy at 1155(GCT) on August 22 in posi- tion 7-31N, 134-16E. It was joined by a Kamikaze class ID at 2100(GCT) on August 24. Two attacks were conducted, and it was believed that the targets were hit.
24.	23-0646	U.S.S. <u>Tullibee</u>	<u>Hokusho Maru</u> , <u>Chiyo</u> <u>Maru</u> and <u>Toyomitsu</u> <u>Maru</u> to be at 11-00N, 148-44E at 2100(GCT) on August 23; 07-58N, 148-44E at 2100(GCT) on August 24.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tulli-</u> <u>bee</u> was patrolling in this area but did not sight the ships.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
24. (Cont.)	U.S.S. Sargo	None		ComSubPac dispatch received. The Sargo was in the area but did not contact the Ultra target.
25. 24-1048	U.S.S. Tunny	Convoy departs Tunny area (Palau) on August 26 and reaches the vicinity of 38, 143K on September 1. Route unknown.	Probable	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tunny attacked a convoy of two vessels and one patrol craft at 7-32N, 134-22E at 0055(GCT) on August 26. There were two hits on the leading ship.
	U.S.S. Seahorse	None		ComSubPac dispatch received. The Seahorse patrolled off Malakal Harbor, Palau, August 26 and 27 but did not definitely sight the Ultra targets.

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August 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
26.	27-1458	<u>U.S.S. Snapper</u>	One merchantman with escort.		Cancelled by 27-1751.
	27-1751	<u>U.S.S. Snapper</u>	One auxiliary car- rier, one damaged cruiser and three destroyers to be at: 27-41N, 151-46E at 2200(GCT) on August 27.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Snapper</u> was not in this vicinity.
27.	28-0820	<u>U.S.S. Snook</u>	Convoy which had de- parted Yokosuka on August 26 might be in the vicinity of Marcus Island enroute Truk.		ComSubPac dispatch received. From August 22 to August 29 the <u>Snook</u> was enroute Marcus Island. No contact was made with the Ultra target.

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Chapter VIII

August 1, 1943

Case 1

According to ComSubPac dispatch 010749 which was addressed to the U.S.S. Steelhead, the U.S.S. Tullibee, and the U.S.S. Pogy, a task force composed of an auxiliary carrier and several battleships, on course 140 degrees, was scheduled to be at position 10-23 N, 147-57 E at 0600 (GCT) on August 4, and at position 8-15 N, 149-40 E nine hours later, heading toward the North Pass. Remaining undetected until contact, the Tullibee was instructed to patrol in position 8-35 N, 149-44 E, and the Pogy to take position at 8-26 N, 149-31 E.¹

At 1532 (GCT) on August 4 the Steelhead sighted a task force consisting of three battleships, an auxiliary carrier and five destroyers, in position 8-17 N, 149-54 E. The submarine conducted a surface attack against one of the battleships and the carrier, damaging the latter vessel.² This is a positive contact with the target reported in Ultra.

1 - Appendix VIII, Case 1, No. B-1, hereafter referred to as VIII, Case 1, B-1.

2 - VIII, Case 1, C-2 and C-3.

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While patrolling in the vicinity of position 8 N, 149 E, on August 5, the Tullibee discovered that it had submerged in the middle of the port screen of a task force. Five or six destroyers were contacted by radar but the heavy units of the force were to the west of the submarine. Confused by the multiplicity of targets, the Tullibee was unable to conduct an attack on any of the vessels;³ however, this may also be considered a positive contact with the task force reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.

On August 5, the Fogy conducted surface and submerged patrols along the Empire-Truk routes. Nothing was sighted and there was no contact with the Ultra target.⁴

Case 2

A Japanese dispatch of July 30 contained the movement report of the O-003 convoy, composed of three unidentified vessels which had departed an unknown port on that day. Points through which the vessels were to pass en route to Palau were listed.

3 - VIII, Case 1, C-5 and C-6.
4 - VIII, Case 1, C-8.

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together with the noon positions (I time) from July 31 through August 8. With the exception of one of the vessels which was to proceed to Rabaul, the convoy was scheduled to arrive at the Western Entrance of Palau on August 9. After interception by Radio Intelligence, this information was phoned to ComSubPac at 1405 (I time) on August 1⁵ and approximately three and one-half hours later, in Ultra serial 9, the U.S.S. Paddle was alerted for the convoy. The following noon positions (I time) were given for the first three days of August: 28 N, 134 E; 25-10 N, 134 E and 22-30 N, 133 E. The submarine also learned that the target would pass through position 24-05 N, 134 E between 1200 (I) on August 2 and 1200 (I) on August 3, at which point the course would be changed. ComSubPac added that later information on this would be sent to the Mingo.⁶

On August 1, the Paddle was patrolling in the vicinity of 22-40 N, 138-56 E, a position to the south and east of the one given for the target on that day. Nothing was sighted through August 4,⁷ and no contacts were made with the Ultra target.

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- 5 - VIII, Case 2, A-1 and A-2.
6 - VIII, Case 2, B-1.
7 - VIII, Case 2, C-1 and C-2.

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to obtain a position ahead of the larger convoy. The leading vessel, identified as being similar to the Amagisan Maru, was attacked but both torpedoes missed their mark. Two escort vessels, one a destroyer, were then contacted and the submarine went to deep submergence in preparation for a depth charge attack. No damage was inflicted and at 0630 (GCT) on August 6, the convoy was again sighted. Four torpedoes were fired at the largest vessel and it was believed that the target was hit and possibly sunk since during subsequent tracking it was determined that the maru was missing from the convoy.¹⁰

This is not a contact with the Ultra target since the convoy sighted and attacked was approximately 8 degrees north of the position of the maru reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.

Radio reception was complete and the Paddle patrolled in the vicinity of the route of the Kunikawa Maru; however, there were no contacts made with the Ultra target.¹¹

10 - VIII, Case 3, C-2 and C-3.

11 - VIII, Case 3, C-4 and C-5.

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During the first week in August, the Tullibee was patrolling in an area west of the route of the Ultra target, and no contacts with the maru¹² were made.

August 2, 1943

Case 4

In an ultra dispatch of August 2, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Seadragon that a convoy would be at position 07-42 N, 160-34 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 4, at position 08-07 N, 163-22 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 5, and at position 08-35 N, 166-10 E at 0300¹³ (GCT) on August 6.

At 0714 (GCT) on August 4, the Seadragon sighted a convoy of three vessels, one transport and one torpedo boat in position 7-04 N, 160-45 E. Two torpedoes were fired at the leading vessel damaging the vessel with one hit; however, further attack was impeded due to depth charging by the escort vessel. No damage was inflicted, however, and at 2035 (GCT) the convoy was again sighted. This time only two vessels with the transport and the escort vessel were

12 - VIII, Case 3, C-6 and C-7.

13 - VIII, Case 4, E-1.

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on course 085 degrees; however, the contact was lost and not regained until the following day, when, at 1459 (GCT) on August 6 an attack was conducted damaging and probably sinking the remaining two freighters, at position 8-49 N, 167-23 E.¹⁴ Both of these attacks may be considered a positive contact with the convoy reported in Ultra.

Case 5

From a message originated by the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Communications Intelligence learned the positions and courses from August 1 through August 7 of a vessel which was thought to be either a German or an Italian submarine. A recognition mark RO 500 had been painted on the bridge, and the vessel was to be treated in the same manner as¹⁵ were the Japanese submarines.

ComSubPac received this intelligence at 2300 (GCT) on August 1, and eight and one half hours later the U.S.S. Paddle was instructed to intercept a German submarine with the RO 500 marking at position

14 - VIII, Case 4, C-2 and C-3.
15 - VIII, Case 5, A-1 and A-2.

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26-44 N, 132-30 E at 0000 (GCT) on August 4 and at position 31-20 N, 132-30 E at 2300 (GCT) on the same day. Further information was sent to the Paddle in Ultra 040840 which stated that the submarine would be met by an escort vessel at a designated time and place.

On August 4, the Paddle was patrolling in the vicinity of 25 N, 142 E, several degrees east of the positions given for the Ultra target. There was no contact with the enemy submarine.

Case 6

The Isokaze escorting the Kyukuto Maru and an unidentified vessel was scheduled to depart Truk at 0500 (I time) on August 3. Leaving the two vessels at position 09-40 N, 147-34 E at 0500 (I time) on the following day, the destroyer was to rendezvous with the Main Body at 1000 (I time). According to a Radio Intelligence comment, the position of rendezvous would be at 10-50 N, 146-22 E on August 4. This information was sent to ComSubPac on August 2 and in Ultra 021024, the U.S.S. Tullibee, the U.S.S. Pozy,

16 - VIII, Case 5, B-1.

17 - VIII, Case 5, B-2.

18 - VIII, Case 5, C-2.

19 - VIII, Case 6, A-1.

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and the U.S.S. Steelhead were instructed to be on the alert for the Kyokuto Maru and another vessel at the position given for 0500 (I time) on August 20
3.

The Tullibee made no entry in the War Patrol Report from July 29 until August 4. No contacts were made with the Ultra target after that date.²¹

On August 2, the Pogy, due to fuel shortage, set its course for Johnston Island from a position several degrees east of the position given for the Ultra target. On the following day the submarine was patrolling the Empire-Truk routes and there was no contact reported with the Kyokuto Maru.²²

Patrolling in the vicinity between 8 and 9 N, and 151 E on August 3 and 4, the Steelhead made no contacts with the vessels reported in the Ultra dispatch.²³

August 3

Case 7

In ComSubPac dispatch 030957, it was

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- 20 - VIII, Case 6, B-1.
 - 21 - VIII, Case 6, C-1 and C-2.
 - 22 - VIII, Case 6, C-3 and C-4.
 - 23 - VIII, Case 6, C-5 and C-6.

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disclosed to the U.S.S. Tullibee and the U.S.S. Steelhead that the Kozan Maru was joining an escort vessel and would be at position 7-15 N, 149 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 5, arriving at the South Entrance of Truk eighteen hours later.²⁴

On August 5, the Steelhead was engaged with the task force reported in Ultra 010749 (See Case 1), and on the following day, departed the area. There²⁵ were no contacts with the Kozan Maru.

Although on August 5 the Tullibee was patrolling in the vicinity of the position given for the Kozan Maru, the vessel was not sighted. However, a large ship was detected by radar on course 090 at 1402 (GCT) August 4 in position 8-28 N, 149-22 E. This may have been the Ultra target. From August 5 through August 10, patrols were conducted along the Saipan-Empire traffic²⁶ lanes, but no contacts were reported.

In the same ComSubPac dispatch, the U.S.S. Mingo received the information that a convoy would be at the following positions at 0300 (GCT) on August 6, 7, 8 respectively: 14-35 N, 133-45 E; 12 N, 132-45 E; 9-35 N, 132-30 E. The vessels were scheduled to pass through position 10 N, 132 E between 0300 (GCT)

24 - VIII, Case 7, B-1.

25 - VIII, Case 7, C-2.

26 - VIII, Case 7, C-4 - C-6.

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on August 7 and 0300 (GCT) on August 8. This convoy²⁷
had also been the target of ComSubPac's Ultra 010831
to the Paddle.²⁸ In the event that the Mingo was
forced to set its course for the home base because of
fuel shortage, ComSubPac suggested that the submarine
watch for an empty tanker en route which would be at
position 11-10 N, 146-40 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 4,
and at position 15-10 N, 132-20 E at the same time on
the following day.²⁹

On August 4 and 5, the Mingo searched
for possible contacts near latitude 15 degrees north.
On August 5 at 2252 (GCT) a convoy of one Wakatake
class destroyer, one Mito class maru, one Maya class
maru and a freighter of either the Taisyo or Nagisan
class maru was sighted in position 13-44 N, 133-22 E.

An attack was conducted against the
Mito class maru and the Maya class maru, after which
all three freighters turned away from the submarine.
The Maya class maru was damaged; however, a shortage
of fuel prevented pursuit of the convoy and on the fol-
lowing day, the Mingo set its course for Midway.³⁰

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- 27 - VIII, Case 7, B-1.
 - 28 - VIII, Case 2, B-1.
 - 29 - VIII, Case 7, B-1.
 - 30 - VIII, Case 7, C-7 - C-9.

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This is only a possible contact with the Ultra target since the convoy was sighted and attacked on April 5 at a position one degree south of the scheduled position of the Ultra target for April 6.

Case 8

On August 3, the Captain of the Otaka originated a dispatch which included the movement report of his vessel departing Truk at 0315 (I time) on the following day en route to Yokosuka. Arrangements were being made for planes and screening vessels to protect the Otaka and its cargo of passengers, planes and machinery from the early morning of August 9 until its arrival at Yokosuka at 1700 (I time).³¹

Radio Intelligence intercepted the message, and after decoding and translating, the information was dispatched to operational headquarters. At 1832 (GCT) on August 3, in Ultra serial 18, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Pogy, the U.S.S. Pike and the U.S.S. Whale that the Otaka would be at position 8-48 N, 155 E at 0740 (GCT) on August 4, and at position 20-37 N,

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153-47 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 6.³² Approximately five hours later, in Ultra serial 19, the submarines were given an additional position, 33-05 N, 145-47 E³³ at 0800 (GCT) on August 8.

Due to fuel shortage, the Pogy had set its course for Johnston Island, and on August 4, patrolled the Empire-Truk routes. From August 6 to August 14, the submarine was en route to Johnston Island, and no contacts were reported with the Ultra target.³⁴

On August 4, the Pike patrolled off the south coast of Marcus Island, but there was no contact with the target reported in Ultra until 0308 (GCT) on August 6 when a converted aircraft carrier of the Kasuga class escorted by one Fubuki class destroyer was sighted steering in a northerly direction from position 21-04 N, 153-31 E. The Pike began a submerged approach and at 0356 (GCT) conducted an attack,³⁵ damaging the carrier. This is a positive contact with the vessel reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.

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- 32 - VIII, Case 8, B-1.
 - 33 - VIII, Case 8, B-2.
 - 34 - VIII, Case 8, C-1 and C-2.
 - 35 - VIII, Case 8, C-3 - C-5.

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The U.S.S. Whale was experiencing bad weather and made no contacts.³⁶ Further information on the Otaka is found in Case 19.³⁷

Case 9

Points through which the #3603 convoy would pass at noon (I time) from August 4 through August 13, en route from Yokosuka to Truk, were listed in a Japanese dispatch originated by the Commanding Officers of the Yokosuka Naval District.³⁸ Approximately two and one-half hours after translation by Radio Intelligence, ComSubPac had received the information and had instructed the U.S.S. Skipjack, the U.S.S. Pollack, and the U.S.S. Sailfish to search for the convoy in the following noon (I time) positions on August 4, 5, and 6 respectively: 32-29 N, 139-42 E; 29-25 N, 140-02 E and 26-14 N, 140-21 E.³⁹

On the designated days, the Skipjack patrolled the southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay; however, only small patrol boats and sampans were sighted. There were no contacts with the convoy reported in Ultra.⁴⁰

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- 36 - VIII, Case 8, C-7.
 - 37 - VIII, Case 19, B-1.
 - 38 - VIII, Case 9, A-1.
 - 39 - VIII, Case 9, B-1.
 - 40 - VIII, Case 9, C-2.

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The Pollack patrolled along the route of the convoy. On August 6 at 0136 (GCT) in position 29-10 N, 141 E a convoy consisting of three ships, the largest of which was similar to the Amagisan Maru, one destroyer and a patrol craft was sighted. Diving, the submarine began a submerged approach and attacked the leading freighter. There were no hits, however, and at 1422 (GCT) four more torpedoes were fired. The Amagisan class maru was damaged with possible sinking reported since during subsequent tracking it was determined that the vessel was missing from the convoy.⁴¹ This is a positive contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac's later dispatch, 050833. (See Case 14)

On August 4, the Sailfish conducted a submerged patrol near the Bonin Islands. No contacts⁴² were reported through August 6.

Case 10

The U.S.S. Mingo was the action addressee of ComSubPac dispatch 041757 which included the noon positions (I time) of a convoy for August 5 and 6.⁴³

41 - VIII, Case 9, C-3 and C-4.

42 - VIII, Case 9, C-7.

43 - VIII, Case 10, B-1.

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On the first of these two dates, the submarine was heading north for possible contacts near latitude 15 N, and on the following day, the Mingo was engaged with a four-ship convoy at position 13-44 N, 133-22 E.⁴⁴ Since on April 5 the Ultra target was scheduled to be at a position three degrees south and two degrees west of the vessels sighted, this may not be considered a contact with the convoy reported by ComSubPac.

August 5, 1943

Case 11

Enemy tankers travelling between Singapore and Truk were given as the target in ComSubPac dispatch 050620 to the U.S.S. Silversides. The submarine was ordered to attempt interception at position 07-15 N, 148-50 E; or, if possible, to back-track and attack them at an earlier time.⁴⁵ Although in the area, the Silversides made no contact with the tankers.⁴⁶

The Tullibee at 1313 (GCT) on August 4 made radar contact with a convoy at 8 N, 149 E.

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- 44 - VIII, Case 10, C-1.
45 - VIII, Case 11, B-1.
46 - VIII, Case 11, C-1 and C-2.

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From August 5-10 the submarine patrolled the Saipan-
Truk traffic lanes.⁴⁷ There was no contact with
ComSubPac's Ultra 050620.

Case 12

In a dispatch originated by the Kwajalein
Base Force #6, noon positions (I time) were listed
from August 5 through August 8 for the #6053 convoy
composed of the Mitakesan Maru, the Santos Maru, the
Kaisho Maru and Subchaser #33 en route from Kwajalein
to the North Channel of Truk. The changes in course
together with the time of departure and arrival were
also included and the message was sent to the Surface
Escort Unit #2.⁴⁸ ComSubPac received this information
from Radio Intelligence and in Ultra 050727, dispatched
the intelligence to the U.S.S. Seadragon.⁴⁹

The operating schedule of the Fujikawa
Maru and an unidentified vessel which were en route
from Taroa to Kwajalein had been sent in a dispatch
originated by an unknown command on August 3.⁵⁰ After
interception and translation by Radio Intelligence

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- 47 - VIII, Case 11, C-4.
 - 48 - VIII, Case 12, A-2.
 - 49 - VIII, Case 12, B-1.
 - 50 - VIII, Case 12, A-1.

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ComSubPac in the same Ultra dispatch instructed the Seadragon to intercept the Fujikawa Maru at position 8-48 N, 168-05 E at 1900 (GCT) on August 5 and at position 8-48 N, 167-36 E three hours later.⁵¹

From August 4 through August 6, the Seadragon was engaged with the convoy reported in Ultra 020723,⁵² and which was traveling in the opposite direction from first target reported in Ultra 050725.⁵³

On August 7, the submarine patrolled near Kwajalein approximately 6 degrees east of the target for that day.⁵⁴ There was no contact with the convoys reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.

August 5, 1943

Case 13

With instructions to the U.S.S. Whale and the U.S.S. Pollack to attempt interception of either an unidentified merchantman or a convoy, ComSubPac listed the noon positions (I time) of the target from August 5 through August 8. In the same dispatch the U.S.S. Pike learned that a convoy would

51 - VIII, Case 12, B-1.

52 - VIII, Case 4, B-1.

53 - VIII, Case 12, B-1.

54 - VIII, Case 12, C-1.

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be at position 22-55 N, 148-25 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 7 and at position 26-20 N, 147 E at 0300 (GCT) on the following day.⁵⁵ The latter information was gathered from a Japanese dispatch originated by an unidentified command on August 3 which had listed the noon positions from August 4 through August 11 of the #803 convoy, departing Truk on August 3 en route to Yokosuka and arriving there on August 11.⁵⁶

On August 4 and August 5 the Whale patrolled east and west across the Tokyo-Truk shipping lane and on the following two days patrols were conducted in the Bonin Islands. At 2045 on August 7 a large freighter similar to the Koshin Maru with an Amagiri class destroyer escort was sighted at position 24-17 N, 142-50 E. Four torpedoes were fired at the freighter, the last one hitting the vessel amidships and sinking the target. To avoid the inevitable enemy aircraft, the Whale surfaced and stood to the Northeast toward the Tokyo-Truk route.⁵⁷

This is not a contact with the Ultra target since on August 7 the vessel, or vessels,

55 - VIII, Case 13, B-1.
56 - VIII, Case 13, A-1.
57 - VIII, Case 13, C-2 - C-3.

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reported in the ComSubPac dispatch were scheduled to be approximately six degrees north of the position of the freighter attacked.

The U.S.S. Pollack at 0136 (GCT) on August 6 sighted a three-ship convoy at position 29-10 N, 141 E. The leading freighter, tentatively identified as being similar to the Amagisan Maru, appeared to be the most important target. An unsuccessful attack was conducted and at 0630 (GCT) the convoy was again sighted. Four torpedoes were fired at the largest vessel and it was believed that the target was hit and possibly sunk.⁵⁸

This is not a contact with the Ultra target since the vessel attacked was four degrees to the north of the scheduled position for the Ultra target that day.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S. Pike, although patrolling in the designated area,⁵⁹ reported no contact with the second Ultra target.⁶⁰

58 - VIII, Case 13, C-4.

59 - VIII, Case 13, C-5 and C-6.

60 - VIII, Case 17, B-2.

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Case 14

From a dispatch originated by the Commanding Officers at Yokosuka Naval Base, it was learned that the departure of the #3803 OTSU convoy had been delayed to 0600 (I time) on August 4. Noon positions were listed from August 5 through August 10 and the convoy's arrival at Saipan was scheduled for 1800 (I time) on August 10. According to a Communications Intelligence comment, the first noon position appeared to be incorrect.

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Operational Headquarters received this information at 0415 (GCT) on August 5 and approximately four hours later the U.S.S. Pollack and the U.S.S. Whale learned in Ultra dispatch 050833 that a three ship convoy would be at position 31-25 N, 140 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 5; at position 29 N, 141 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 6; at position 25-55 N, 142-15 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 7; at position 22-40 N, 143-30 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 8; at position 19-25 N, 144-40 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 9 and at position 16 N, 145-30 E at the same time on the subsequent day.

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61 - VIII, Case 14, A-1.
62 - VIII, Case 14, B-1.

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At 0136 (GCT) on August 6 the Pollack sighted a three ship convoy at position 29-10 N, 141 E. An attack was conducted on the largest freighter similar to the Amagisen Maru. There were no hits and the submarine began swinging to the left in order to attain a position of attack on the second freighter. The destroyer escort, however, prevented the approach and the Pollack was forced to deep submergence. At 1422 (GCT) having reached a position ahead of the convoy, the submarine once more attacked the largest freighter. Two flashes, followed by muffled explosions, were seen on the target. It was believed that the freighter was hit, possibly sinking. 63

This is a positive contact with the target reported in Ultra.

Case 15

According to a Japanese dispatch of July 22nd, the Hokuan Maru and the Shinshu Maru, both carrying fuel oil, had departed Singapore for Truk at 0800 (I time) July 23rd and were scheduled to arrive at 0900 (I time) on August 7. Approximate noon positions were listed from July 24 through August 6. 64

63 - VIII, Case 14, C-2 and C-3.
64 - VIII, Case 15, A-1.

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Radio Intelligence intercepted this dispatch on July 24th and ComSubPac, in Ultra 051759, instructed all submarines covering the NPM Fox, with the U.S.S. Tullibee and the U.S.S. Steelhead as action addressees, to intercept two tankers which would be at the following noon positions (I time) on August 5 and August 6 respectively: 06-35 N, 135-45 E; 07-15 N, 148-50 E.⁶⁵

The ComSubPac dispatch was received⁶⁶ and the Tullibee was patrolling in the designated area; however, no contact with the Ultra target was reported.⁶⁷

On August 5 the U.S.S. Steelhead was engaged with a nine-ship convoy, making contact with the tankers impossible.⁶⁸

On August 6 the U.S.S. Silversides was near 2-36 N, 152-45 E. No contact with the Ultra target was reported.⁶⁹

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- 65 - VIII, Case 15, B-1.
 - 66 - VIII, Case 15, C-1.
 - 67 - VIII, Case 15, C-2.
 - 68 - VIII, Case 15, C-4.
 - 69 - VIII, Case 15, C-6.

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Case 16

In Ultra 051853 the U.S.S. Salmon learned that three or four submarines on an unrecovered course would be at position 50-45 N, 156-10 E at 0700 (GCT) on August 5 and at position 45-40 N, 142 E at an unknown time two days later.⁷⁰

On August 5 the Salmon patrolled the approaches to Nemuro Kaikyo and on August 7 the submarine was engaged with a freighter at position 45-50 N, 143-35 E. Although this was in the vicinity of the position given for the Ultra target, no contacts with enemy submarines were reported.⁷¹

August 6

Case 17

A Japanese message originated at Palau on August 4 and intercepted by Radio Intelligence, contained the movement report of the FU 404 convoy composed of the Aobasan Maru, bound for Moji,⁷² and an unidentified maru, the Nissho Maru and the Kansai Maru, escorted by the Hato, bound for Ujina. Points through which the vessels would pass and the noon

70 - VIII, Case 16, B-1.

71 - VIII, Case 16, C-2.

72 - VIII, Case 17, A-1.

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positions (I time) from August 5 to August 9 were included in the Intelligence.⁷³

On August 6 at 0814 (GCT) ComSubPac in Ultra Serial 28 alerted the U.S.S. Paddle for a convoy which would be at position 25-20 N, 135-30 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 8; at position 30-05 N, 134-40 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 9, passing through position 28 N, 135-30 E between 0300 (GCT) on August 8 and 0300 (GCT) on August 9, and later at an unknown time, through position 31-30 N, 134 E. In the same ComSubPac dispatch the U.S.S. Pike received as a target another convoy which was scheduled to be at the following noon positions (I time) on August 7, 8 and 9 respectively: 23-31 N, 141-51 E; 21-05 N, 144-04 E and 18-22 N, 145-20 E.⁷⁴

The U.S.S. Paddle was in the area and received the ComSubPac dispatch.⁷⁵ Although the Paddle did not sight the convoy, it is possible that it contacted the Hato which was the convoy's escort.

73 - VIII, Case 17, A-2.
74 - VIII, Case 17, B-1.
75 - VIII, Case 17, C-1.

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The convoy, traveling north, was scheduled to be at 30-05 N, 134-32 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 9.⁷⁶ At 0343 (GCT) on that date in position 30-15 N, 134-32 E the submarine on course 249° sighted a small ship which was 20,000 yards distant on a southerly course. The Paddle was unable to close for⁷⁷ attack. The position and time are almost identical, and it is possible that this was the Hato circling the convoy.

Although the submarine identified the⁷⁸ ship as a destroyer by mast, bridge structure, and stack, the similarity in size and superstructure of the Hato to a small destroyer lends further proof that the contact was the Hato. Furthermore, the Paddle stated that its contact had one stack; most Japanese destroyers have two whereas the Hato had but one. For these reasons this may be considered a possible contact with the Ultra target.

In an operational dispatch of August 9 from the U.S.S. Pike to ComSubPac, it was learned that

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- 76 - VIII, Case 17, B-1.
 - 77 - VIII, Case 17, C-2.
 - 78 - VIII, Case 17, C-3.

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the submarine had search for the convoys which had
been listed in the Ultra Serials 24⁷⁹ (See Case 13)
and 28;⁸⁰ however, no contact had been made with the
targets.⁸¹

Case 18

In Ultra 060821 the U.S.S. Skipjack
learned that a convoy would have been at position
32-25 N, 143-05 E at 0300 (GCT) on August 5 and at
position 34-45 N, 139-50 E at the same time on
August 6.⁸² Apparently there was an error in trans-
mission for, according to the Japanese Intelligence
dispatch from which this information was gathered,
the two positions given were for August 10 and 11.⁸³
Included in the same Ultra dispatch were the noon
positions (I time) on August 7 and 8 for another
convoy.⁸⁴

Although the Skipjack was patrolling
in the vicinity of the positions given for both con-
voys,⁸⁵ neither target was sighted.

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- 79 - VIII, Case 13, B-1.
 - 80 - VIII, Case 17, B-1.
 - 81 - VIII, Case 17, B-2.
 - 82 - VIII, Case 18, B-1.
 - 83 - VIII, Case 18, A-1.
 - 84 - VIII, Case 18, B-1.
 - 85 - VIII, Case 18, C-2.

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Case 19

A Kasuga class carrier was the target
of ComSubPac's 070819⁸⁶ to the U.S.S. Whale and 080851⁸⁷
to the U.S.S. Skipjack. This carrier had previously⁸⁸
been damaged by the U.S.S. Pike.

The Whale was directed to search for the
damaged carrier on a direct route to Yokosuka or
Chichijima.⁸⁹ The Whale's radio reception was normal.⁹⁰
The submarine on August 6 was fighting heavy seas. On
August 7 it headed south-southeast en route to Saipan
and then back to the northeast to cover the Tokyo-Truk
lane east of the Bonins. On August 7 at 2045 (GCT) it
was engaged with a large freighter and destroyer at⁹¹
24-17 N, 142-50 E. The freighter was sunk. No con-
tact was made with the damaged carrier.

The U.S.S. Skipjack was given the position
scheduled for 2000 (GCT) August 8, (prior to the origi-
nal attack) 34-10 N, 141-50 E, course unknown.⁹² The
Skipjack reported excellent radio reception,⁹³ and on

-
- 86 - VIII, Case 19, B-1.
87 - VIII, Case 19, B-2.
88 - VIII, Case 8, C-4 and C-5.
89 - VIII, Case 19, B-1.
90 - VIII, Case 19, C-1.
91 - VIII, Case 19, C-2 and C-3.
92 - VIII, Case 19, B-2.
93 - VIII, Case 19, C-4.

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August 8, 9, 10, and 11 patrolled the south and south-eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.⁹⁴ No contact was reported with the damaged carrier.

August 7.

Case 20

The movement report of the #3603 convoy which had departed Yokosuka on August 3 en route to Truk was sent to an unidentified command in a dispatch originated by the Commanding Officers of the Yokosuka Naval District.⁹⁵ This message was intercepted by Radio Intelligence and sent to ComSubPac who instructed the U.S.S. Tullibee and the U.S.S. Steelhead to intercept three unidentified merchantmen at given noon positions (I time) for August 10 through August 13.⁹⁶

⁹⁷
The ComSubPac dispatch was received and at 0406 (GCT) on August 10 the Tullibee sighted three vessels with an escort vessel at position 11-43 N, 147-34 E. Having attained an attack position, the submarine fired three torpedoes; however, it was believed that they were set too deep and went under the

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- 94 - VIII, Case 19, C-5.
 - 95 - VIII, Case 20, A-1.
 - 96 - VIII, Case 20, B-1.
 - 97 - VIII, Case 20, C-1.

ORIGINAL

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target. At 0902 (GCT) the Tullibee surfaced and began pursuit of the convoy. Contact was not regained, however, since the vessels had made a radical change in course.⁹⁸ This is a possible contact with the Ultra target.

At this time the U.S.S. Steelhead was en route to Pearl Harbor, making it impossible to contact the convoy reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.⁹⁹

August 12, 1943

Case 21

A convoy approaching from the southeast was scheduled to arrive at position 17-16 N, 134-30 E at dawn on August 14. This information was sent to the U.S.S. Swordfish in ComSubPac dispatch 120926.¹⁰⁰

It is possible that the north position was incorrect due to an error in transmission since, according to the Japanese intelligence dispatch from which this intelligence was gathered, the convoy was scheduled to arrive at the eastern entrance of Palau, making the position 07-16 N.¹⁰¹

98 - VIII, Case 20, C-2.

99 - VIII, Case 20, C-4 and C-5.

100 - VIII, Case 21, B-1.

101 - VIII, Case 21, A-1.

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The Swordfish was conducting a surface patrol along the Palau-Rabaul lane on August 14. No contacts were made with the Ultra target.¹⁰²

August 13, 1943

Case 22

During the month of August Eastern Area convoys were scheduled to depart from Kwajalein on August 13 and 27 and from Truk on August 6, it was learned from a Japanese intelligence dispatch on July 1.¹⁰³ ComSubPac received this information from Radio Intelligence and in Ultra Serial 50, instructed the U.S.S. Seadragon to be on the alert for a convoy departing Kwajalein on August 13 en route to Truk.¹⁰⁴

The submarine, patrolling near Kwajalein, sighted on August 13 at 2256 (GCT), an AK similar to the Akagi Maru with three escort vessels in position 8-45 N, 167-40 E.¹⁰⁵ This is not a contact with the Ultra target scheduled to ply between Kwajalein and Truk since the vessels sighted were to the east of Kwajalein while Truk is toward the west.

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- 102 - VIII, Case 21, C-2.
 - 103 - VIII, Case 22, A-1.
 - 104 - VIII, Case 22, B-1.
 - 105 - VIII, Case 22, C-2.

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15 January 1946

Another convoy was sighted by the ¹⁰⁶
Seadragon on August 21, at position 8-10 N, 163-45 E;
however, neither may this be considered a contact with
the convoy reported in Ultra.

August 20, 1943

Case 23

Radio Intelligence intercepted a Japanese dispatch sent from Guard District 43 to Palau which disclosed that the Seisi Maru would depart at 1600 (I time) on August 20 in order to escort the #2085 convoy. The rendezvous would be effected in position 08-22 N, 134-23 E at 0500 (I time) on the following day. ¹⁰⁷ ComSubPac received the information at 0700 (GCT) August 20 and dispatched the intelligence to the U.S.S. Tunny in Ultra 200930. ¹⁰⁸

The Tunny was conducting a patrol in the Marianas Islands area from August 18 through 21 and at this time the convoy reported in Ultra was scheduled to be near Palau. On August 22, the submarine patrolled near Toagel Klungui Pass in the Palaus and at

106 - Ibid.
107 - VIII, Case 23, A-1.
108 - VIII, Case 23, B-1.

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position 7-31 N, 134-16 E a six-ship convoy was sighted. An attack was conducted but due to a range error none of the three torpedoes fired were hits. The Tunny continued to pursue the vessels and at 2100 (GCT) on August 24, a Kamikaze class destroyer¹⁰⁹ was noted to have joined the convoy. Although according to the ComSubPac dispatch, the rendezvous for which the Tunny had been alerted was scheduled for August 20, it is possible that this is a contact with the Ultra target. Another attack was conducted on two of the vessels and it was believed that the targets were hit.

August 23, 1943

Case 24

It was learned from a Japanese dispatch sent from Base Force Number 4 at Truk on August 22 that the Hokusho Maru, the Chiyo Maru and the Toyomitu Maru would be at given positions at 0600 (I time) on August 24 and 25, arriving at Point N at 0900 on August 26th. The patrol unit Commander was ordered

109 - VIII, Case 23, C-2.

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to dispatch two ships of his command to rendezvous with the above convoy at Point A where they would assist two vessels of Subchaser Division 60 bringing the convoy into port. ¹¹⁰ Approximately twenty-two hours after receiving this information from Radio Intelligence, ComSubPac alerted the U.S.S. Tullibee and the U.S.S. Sargo for the Hokusho Maru, Chiyo Maru, and Toyomitu Maru which would be at position 11 N, 148-44 E at 2100 (GCT) on August 23 and at position 07-58 N, 148-44 E at the same time on the ¹¹¹ subsequent day.

The Tullibee, although patrolling in the area, reported no contact with the Ultra target. ¹¹² The Sargo was patrolling to the north of the position given in the ComSubPac dispatch and made no contacts ¹¹³ with the Hokusho Maru.

August 24, 1943

Case 25

On August 24, the U.S.S. Tunny and the U.S.S. Seahorse were informed that two days later a convoy was scheduled to depart the area patrolled by

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- 110 - VIII, Case 24, A-1.
 - 111 - VIII, Case 24, B-1.
 - 112 - VIII, Case 24, C-2.
 - 113 - VIII, Case 24, C-4 and C-5.

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120
the auxiliary carrier was the Otaka which was be-
lieved to have been hit by the U.S.S. Pike on
121
August 6.

On August 27, the Snapper was engaged
with a patrol vessel 6 degrees north and 7 degrees
122
west of the Ultra target. There was no contact with
the vessels reported in the ComSubPac dispatch.

August 28

Case 27

At 0820 (GCT) on August 28 the U.S.S.
Snook was warned by ComSubPac that a convoy which
had departed Yokosuka around August 26 might be in
123
the vicinity of Marcus Island en route to Truk.

From August 22 to August 29 the Snook
was en route to Marcus Island. Submerged patrols
were conducted in the vicinity of the Island but
124
no contacts were made with the Ultra target.

-
- 120 - VIII, Case 26, A-2.
 - 121 - VIII, Case 8, C-4 and C-5.
 - 122 - VIII, Case 26, C-2.
 - 123 - VIII, Case 27, E-1.
 - 124 - VIII, Case 27, C-2.

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APPENDIX VIII

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - August, 1943

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 29/1648 July
TO: _____ ((garbled) 79338
INFO: _____
_____ ((Tokyo Transportation Section)
_____ ((Bureau Establishments)
_____ ((Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
_____ ((Kure Chief of Staff)

*(1). It is planned to have following units sail from Empire to PT about _____ (date) under command of _____ ((Screening destroyers will be added as available). Main force / _____ BB of BatDiv 2) _____ ((BB of BatDiv 2), Yamato and Hatsukaze [_____]).

Advance Force / Takao _____ Atago (_____ and Umikaze (_____ Otaka _____ and unident).

(2). Tanikaze _____ and blank are scheduled to depart Western Inland Sea on (_____ (date) and act as screen for Hayataka [_____].

(3). Suitable ships will be employed to transport personnel and material to the Southeastern Area and to this end _____ (-unident) in the Kure Area and _____ (-unident) in the Yokosuka Area are to contact Tokyo Transportation Office and make necessary arrangements in accordance with instructions contained in Combined Fleet SMS 191027 of July."

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 1, No. A-1 (Cont.)

NEGAT COMMENT: Our only copy of this message is not in very good shape.

Review of above despatch and other recent messages concerning movement to PT of battleships reveals that Musashi Yamato, and 2 ships of BatDiv 2 are scheduled to make this trip, the Musashi being slated to depart on 31 July and the other three on unrecovered date represented by code group

ORIGINAL

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Case 1, No. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Sent in HYPO's 300222-300236, but with several differences. PT is Truk (CD).

No. A-2

FROM: Blank Originator 30/1258 July
TO: (Tokyo Communication Unit) 73715

INFO:

(Address at Ominato July 11)

"From ComDesRon 2.

Nagara, Unyo, Akebono
blanks will use following communication plan until they join up with main body (at 0600 on August 1):

1. Receive Tokyo Communication Unit #1 and #2 broadcasts and #4 Communication Unit broadcasts.
2. Yokosuka Communication Unit blanks.
3. Radio Guard Ship: Nagara.
4. From 0500 on August 1 until rendezvous, Nagara set watches in accordance plans and

NEGAT COMMENT: We are now working 301548--
which begins as follows "DesRon 2 (Nagara), Unyo and Akebono will depart Yokosuka tomorrow the 31st at 0730."

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Case 1 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

(Southeast Area
Fleet)

01/0118 August
96150

INFO:

"From ComDesDiv 17. The Isokaze (unident vessel) and Kyokuto Maru) will depart PT at 0500, 3rd August. She will cease escorting at 0500, 4th August in position 09-40 North, 147-34 East, and rendezvous with the Main Body about 1000."

GI COMMENT: ComSubFor informed at 1115(-9) August 2. Plot indicated Isokaze will meet Main Body on "Route #1" at 10-50 North, 146-22 East at 1000 (-9) Aug. 4th.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
STEELHEAD
TULLIBEE
POGY

01/0749 August

FROM COMSUBPAC COMES ULTRA SERIAL 8 FOR TULLIBEE
POGY AND STEELHEAD ONLY X GEE BAG OF BIG PEANUTS
CONTAINING 1 AUXILIARY CARRIER AND SEVERAL BATTLE-
SHIPS X COURSE 140 X 0600 X 4TH (10-23 NORTH 147-
57 EAST) AND 9 HOURS LATER (8-15 NORTH 149-50 EAST)
THEN TO NORTH PASS X TAKE STATION AS FOLLOWS IN TIME
TO RENDER HONORS X TULLIBEE (8-35 NORTH 149-44 EAST)
POGY IF SUFFICIENT FUEL AND TORPEDOES REMAINING
(8-26 NORTH 149-31 EAST) X FIX POSITIONS ACCURATELY
BY LAND MARK X REMAIN UNDETECTED IN VICINITY OF
TRACK UNTIL CONTACT X SAURY OR PADDLE MAY SLOW THIS
OUTFIT UP FARTHER NORTH.

ORIGINAL

15 January 1945

Case 1 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No difficulty was experienced in copying the submarine schedules.

No. C-2

August 5

0132 (L)

Lat. 08-17N, Long. 149-54E. SJ radar made contact on several ships bearing 300 T. Distance 9500 yards. The sky was overcast and cloudy on that bearing and no ships could be made out at the time. Commenced trailing from what developed into the starboard bow of a task force consisting of 3 capital ships, an XCV and 5 DD's. Three DD's were disposed ahead of the main body and one on each flank. The formation was zigging between 030T. and 170 T. on 6 to 8 minute legs and making 19 or 20 knots. Decided to work around the DD on the starboard flank and attack the last two ships in the main column which were a large BB and the XCV. Conducted attack on those two targets, remaining on the surface for the entire attack. At

0244 (L)

Latitude 08-15N. Longitude 150-07E when the range to the XCV was 7500 yards, angle on the bow 80 at starboard; fired 6 torpedoes at the XCV, then swung right and fired four torpedoes at the BB. Believe we obtained two hits on the XCV for at

0250 (L)

Heard two explosions timed to correspond to the interval between the first two shots fired. This was followed in 30 seconds by three rapid, loud explosions, probably depth charges, which at 11,000 yards shook the boat from stem to stern. Those were the loudest we have ever heard and must correspond to block busters. Explosions continued to be heard until at

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Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0259 (L) Heard last, and rather dull explosion. When explosions first started, observed the targets closely, but the clouds on the horizon now practically obscured them. Several lookouts reported seeing smoke and the OOD confirmed this observation.

0330 (L) Retired westward on the surface at flank speed and at Lat. 08-18.5N, Long. 149-54E. SJ radar made contact at 11,000 yards bearing 350 T. This turned out to be a CL or a large DD which was making high speed to the eastward. We were not able to identify the target until the range had closed to 10,000 yards and he then walked right away from us at 24 knots. At

0345 (L) Lost radar contact. For the next two days we were working our way up to the northeast corner of the area.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	7	8
Date	8/5	8/5
Time	0132 (L)	0330 (L)
Position	8-17N 149-54E	8-18.5N 149-54E
Course	110T ZZ	110T ZZ
Speed	19-20 knots	High about 24
Type and Description	3 capital ships (one a large BB) and 1 XCV with 5 DD - three fanned out in a semi-circle ahead and one ranging on each flank of the formation. The Capital ships and the XCV were in column. Total - 9.	Not made out clearly. Looked like CL or DD leader.

ORIGINAL
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Case 1 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory. All serials were received with the exception of 73 William.

No. C-5

August 5

Continued tracking.....

0105 (L) S.J. contacts from 126T to 196T several at 8,000 to 9,000 yards and one bearing 170T distant 17,200 yards at which contact faded. Trailed the targets. At

0142 (L) S.J. picked up a large target at 174T distant 15,400 yards, commenced chasing at flank speed. This target was apparently making about 16 knots on course 090T and when we had closed to 11,900 yards we were challenged by, or a ship was signalling with a flashing light ("SK" in Morse) on bearing 150T. The rain in the meantime had let up and the visibility was somewhat improved. Slowed to standard speed. Could get no S.J. contact on bearing of challenge and several other lights appeared so reversed course. Could see lights between 130T and 236T (Total of six) Some were flashing red and some looked like blinker tubes. Tried to get S.J. contacts on these but could not so figured that we had run into a line of patrol boats. Went ahead flank and proceeded to clear vicinity on course 355T. Saw last of lights at 0216(L). Slowed to standard at 0233(L). Checked over data and figured that our targets were making about 16 knots and since we would have to pull an end run around the patrol line and in that our speed advantage was only 3 to 4 knots, that we would not be able to catch up with the enemy before daybre

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 1, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Abandoned chase and proceeded towards assigned area. A later plot of radar and sound contacts revealed that we had submerged about in the middle of the port screen (consisting of 5 or 6 DD's) of a task force. Formation course 200T, speed 16 knots. The heavy units were well to the west of us and were not picked up by radar until after we had surfaced. Needless to say, there was much confusion because of the multiplicity of targets. A PPI scope would have enabled us to steer clear of the screen and to position ourselves for an attack on the heavy units. At no time was radar interference noted and if this task force had radar they were not using it. No pinging was heard from the destroyers.

0630 (L) Submerged.
1431 (L) Surfaced.
1955 (L) Entered area.

No. C-6

Description of Contact

No.	4	5
Date	8/4 and 5	8/5
Time	2355(L) to 0018(L)	0102(L)
Position	8-37N 149-24E	8-28N 149-22E
Types	? (DD)	?
Init. Range	10,500	17,200
Est. Cour.		
Spd.	200 15 kts.	090 16 Kts.
How contact	R. & sound	R
Remarks	5 or 6 ships believed to be DD's.	A large ship

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 1, No. C-6 (Cont.)

No.	6
Date	8/5
Time	0152 (L)
Position	8-28N 149-25E
Types	?
Init. Range	?
Est. Cour.	?
Spd.	?
How contact	SN
Remarks	Several lights believed to be patrol boat line.

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

No. C-8

August 4

Set course 270 true for position on
Empire-Truk routes.

August 5

Surface and submerged patrol on Empire-
Truk routes.

August 6

Set course for Johnston Island. Sent
dispatch to ComSubPac.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 30/1232 July
TO: (Surface Escort Unit #2) (B) 36328 (Part 2 of 2)
(4th Fleet) (B)
(Kure Chief of Staff) (B)
INFO: (Associated Kolombangara)
(8th Fleet) (B)
(Palao Transmits)

(1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
(Sasebo Chief of Staff) (C)
(Chichijima Special Base Force) (B)

"(Part 2). Noon positions from 31st to 8th.

31st, 30-40 North, 133-30 East.
1st, 28-00 North, 134-00 East.
2nd, 25-10 North, 134-00 East.
3rd, 22-30 North, 133-10 East.
4th, 20-00 North, 132-50 East.
5th, 17-20 North, 133-30 East.
6th, 14-12 North, 133-45 East.
7th, 12-00 North, 132-45 East.
8th, 09-35 North, 132-30 East.

(Part 3). Cargo blank ammunition blanks coal."

GI COMMENT: This is part 2 of Jap 2-parter. Part 1 (NSS 010143 August) contained list of points through which this "Convoy O-003" was to pass enroute Palao. One ship

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(unident) is to proceed to Rabaul.
Information from both parts was phoned to ComSubPacFor at 1405 (-9) August 1.
Second part received in NSS 010331 with better position for the 6th (14-35 North). This was phoned ComSubPacFor at 1520 (-9) August 1.

No. A-2

FROM:		30/1232 July
TO:	(4th Fleet)	23560
INFO:	(Combined Fleet)	
	(8th Fleet)	
	(blank Fleet)	
	(Chief of Staff Yokosuka)	
	(Chichijima Comm. Unit)	

"Convoy O-003 (A ships all unidentified) departed blank at 0900 July 30th, will pass through points:

30-00 North, 134-00 East.
24-05 North, 134-00 East.
21-15 North, 132-30 East.
15-15 North, 134-00 East.
10-00 North, 132-00 East.

And arrive Western Entrance blank at 1200 August 9th. (- unident ship) to RR remainder to PP. Speed 8 knots. Patrol boat #31 escort as far as Palao Naniwa Maru as far as 29 North."

(Part 1 of 2)

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 2, No. A-2 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: RR is Rabaul (CD).
PP is Palao (CD).

(2) Noon positions: (31st through 8th)

31st, 30-40 North, 133-30 East.
1st, 28-00 North, 134-00 East.
2nd, 25-10 North, 134-00 East.
3rd, 22-30 North, 135-10 East.
4th, 20-00 North, 132-50 East.
5th, 17-20 North, 133-30 East.
6th, 14-35 North, 133-45 East.
7th, blank-00 North, 132-45 East.
8th, 09-35 North, 130-blank East.

Blanks ammunition coal."

(Part. 2 of 2)

GI COMMENT: HYPO's version, more complete, was
phoned ComSubPacFor at 1405 (-9)
August 1. NEGAT had better posit
for August 6 (HYPO had 14-12N).
This additional info phoned to
SubPac at 1520 (-9) August 1.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PADDLE
ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX

01/0831

PREC: OP OP OP

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 2, No. B-1

FOR PADDLE X SERIAL 9 FROM COMSUBPAC X ULTRA X
CONVOY X 0300 X 1ST X (28 NORTH 134 EAST) POSITIONS
AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE (25-10 NORTH
134 EAST) (22-30 NORTH 133-00 EAST) X WILL PASS
THROUGH (24-05 NORTH 134-00 EAST) BETWEEN LAST
2 POSITS AND CHANGEZ COURSE AT THAT POINT X MORE
DOPE ON THIS ONZ LATER FOR MINGO

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Paddle

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was generally good
and complete.

No. C-2

August 1

0300 (K) Changed course to west. No morning stars.
Sky heavily overcast.
0950 (K) Obtained sun-sight.
1000 (K) Submerged.
1900 (I) Surfaced. No star sights possible.

August 2

0005 (I) At D.R. position 22-40N 138-56E. Commenced
one engine patrol of triangular area about
desired 0800 position. Sky overcast. Oc-
casional showers, clearing just before dawn
and in time to obtain star sights.
0500 (I) Obtained a good fix showing us to be 18
miles due south of desired 0800 position.
Had experienced unusual set to south.
0502 (I) Changed course to 010° T at 15 knots to close
0800 position.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 2, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0522 (I) Changed course to 090°T at 15 knots.
0613 (I) Submerged for periscope patrol, assuming
that further search was impracticable in
view of expected air patrol and low clouds.
0830 (I) Heavy rain to south-west. Sky generally
overcast. Light choppy swell. Numerous
white caps. Occasional showers throughout
the morning. Visibility variable from poor
to good.
0840 (I) Changed course to 330° T.
1155 (I) Sighted land or carrier based plane bearing
121° - 30' T on horizon.
1156 (I) Plane lost in clouds.
1157 (I) Changed course to 090° T.
1202 (I) Sighted bomber bearing 044° T distant 6
miles. Both planes on a southerly course.
1300 (I) Occasional showers throughout afternoon.
Heavy rain at 1515 (I) Visibility variable.
1858 (I) Surfaced on course 090° T and commenced one
engine (10 knots) patrol to eastward.

August 3

1205 (I) Position 22-20-30N 142-07-00E Changed
course to 021° T.
1412 (I) Position 22-47-00N 142-18-00E Changed
course to 000° T.

August 4

0055 (I) Look-out and O.O.D. simultaneously picked
up odor of stack gases on south-easterly
bearing.
0058 (I) Changed course to 135° T.
0432 (I) Made trim dive.
0446 (I) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol, searching
with #1 periscope.
2000 (I) Changed course to west to pass between Kita
Io Shima and Io Shima of Ogasawara Gunto
group.
2320 (I) SJ radar picked up Kita Io Shima (2631 ft.)
at approximate range of 45,000 yards.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 29/2235 July
TO: 32508
(Yokosuka address) (C)
INFO: (Bureau of Establishments) (A)
(Kure Naval District CofS) (B)
(Naval Transportation
Section Tokyo) (B)
(Rabaul Seaplane Base) (B)
(Associated Transportation ?)
(All Ships blank Area) (C)
(Transportation Section
blank) (C)

"Kunikawa Maru), Hakusan Maru
/under escort of Minazuki) and Yunagi
/depart Rabaul at blank time (200?),
30th July. At 0730 blank St. George Point."

(Part 1 of 2)

*At 0130 July 31, 03-41 S, 153-00 E.
At 0700 July 31, 02-40 S, 152-50 E.
At 1230 July 31, 02-00 S, 152-00 E.
Course until 1900 will be 000.
At 1700 Aug. 2, arrive Truk.
At 1200 Aug. 1, depart Rabaul Radio Zone and enter
Truk Radio Zone. Many blanks. Then blank separate
in position 03-40 N, 151-10 E. Arrive Yokosuka
1300, August 9.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Noon positions:

2nd August, 05-20 N, 148-10 E.
4th August, 11-40 N, 142-00 E.
6th August, 21-blank, blank.
8th August, 30-blank, blank.

At 0800 blank date enter Yokosuka Radio Zone."

(Part 2 of 2)

No. A-2

FROM: 29/2235 July
TO: 32508
(Yokosuka address) (C)
INFO: (Bureau of Establishments) (A)
(Naval District CofS Kure) (B)
(Naval Transportation
Section Tokyo) (B)
(Seaplane Base Rabaul) (B)
(Associated Transportation (?) (B)
(All ships blank area) (C)
(Transportation Section blank) (C)

Part 1. Kunikawa Maru) and Hakusan Maru
) under escort of Minazuki and Yunagi
) depart Rabaul at blank time (0200?) July
30. At 0730 posit 9 miles south of St. George
Point."

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"At 0130 July 31, 03-41 South, 153-00 East.
At 0700 July 31, 02-40 South, 152-50 East.
At 1230 July 31, 02-00 South, 152-00 East.

Then course until 1900 will be ~~000~~. Arrive Truk
1700 August 2. At 1200 August 1 depart Rabaul
Radio Zone enter Truk Radio Zone.

Part 2. At 1900 August 1 in posit 03-40 North,
150-00 East Kunikawa Maru leave convoy. Scheduled
to arrive Yokosuka 1300 August 9. Noon posits.

2 August 05-20 North, 148-10 East.
4 August 11-40 North, 142-00 East.
6 August 21-blank North, 139-05 East.
8 August 30-50 North, 137-30 East.

At 0800 blank date enter Yokosuka Radio Zone.

(Part 2 of 2)

GI COMMENT: Underlined portions added later but
not sent out.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 01/0943 August
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
PADDLE
POLLACK
TULLIBEE

PREG: OP OP OP

COMSUBPAC SENDS NUMBER 10 X ULTRA X SHIP LISTED
ON PAGE 063 OF ONI 14 AT 0300 GCT ON AUGUST 2ND
4TH 6TH AND 8TH RESPECTIVELY X (5-20 NORTH 148-
10 EAST) (11-40 NORTH 142-00 EAST) (21-00 NORTH
139-05 EAST) (30-50 NORTH 137-50 EAST) X POLLACK
AND PADDLE HANDLE IN VICINITY OF YOUR AREAS X
TULLIBEE ATTEMPT INTERCEPTION IF IT DOESN'T INTER-
FERE WITH MY SERIAL 8

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pollack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception throughout the patrol was entirely satisfactory and complete in that no serial number messages were missed.

No. C-2

August 6

0430 (I)	Dived.
0850 (I)	Sighted two freighters on course 000°T., bearing 084°T., range 12,000 yards. Waited until freighters were out of sight and at
1020 (I)	Surfaced to give chase.
1036 (I)	Sighted three ship convoy on course 200°T., bearing 340°T., range 20,000 yards. As we were in a much better position to get in on this group, gave up the chase on the two freighters and commenced maneuvering to obtain position ahead of the three ship convoy.
1336 (I)	Dived and commenced submerged approach. Freighters appeared to be in a staggered column about 1200 yards apart, with the second in column slightly on the starboard quarter of the leader, and the third on the port quarter still further astern. The formation was zig-zagging from 15 to 40 degrees at intervals of five and six minutes. No escorts in sight. Leading freighter was tentatively identified as being similar to the AMAGISAN MARU listed on page 123 ONI 208-J. It appeared to be the most important target. The other two freighters were not identified but appeared to be of about 5,000 tons.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1440 (I) Coming in for a 60° track on the leading freighter when it zigged toward, leaving us about 300 yards from the track. Turned away at.
- 1446 (I) Fired two stern tubes at leading freighter on 126° track at a range of 800 yards. Missed. Commenced swinging left to get the second freighter with the bow tubes.
- 1451 (I) Depth charge exploded, not too close, while we were still turning at 80 feet. Came to periscope depth and found that we were about 600 yards abeam of the second freighter. This ship was clearly seen to be towing a heavy cable similar to those used by our magnetic mine sweepers except that it seemed to be towing much deeper. Shortly after the periscope was raised she commenced blowing her whistle. Took a quick look around and discovered a DE escort on our starboard quarter coming in. The escort must have been trailing the convoy and masked by the freighters, as I had been unable to see it previously. We did not have time to turn for a straight bow shot at the second freighter and the set up did not look good for a large angle shot, so we went to deep submergence and rigged for depth charge. Two sets of high speed screws were heard indicating the presence of a second escort which had not been sighted. Echo ranging was heard from one escort, probably the DE; but much to my surprise no further depth charges were dropped. We were, however, under a sharp negative temperature gradient as indicated by the Bathythermograph; so undoubtedly the escorts were unable to pick us up.
- 1530 (I) Came to periscope depth and sighted convoy bearing 182°T.
- 1655 (I) Surfaced and gave chase, working around for position ahead. Fully expected to be forced down by aircraft and was much surprised to have none appear.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 2245 (I) Reached position ahead; but decided to wait for the moon to set and to attack on the surface.
- 2322 (I) Fired four bow tubes at the largest freighter which now appeared to be in the middle of the convoy, estimated 80° track, range 2480 yards.
- 2324 (I) At about the estimated time of torpedo run, a tremendous explosion shook the POLLACK and literally lifted her out of the water. A great glow of light was seen in the water all around the hull. Men were knocked off their feet in the after part of the ship, and the main contactors were jarred out causing the loss of all power. The ship slowed to practically dead in the water before power could be regained, and it was indeed a bad few minutes for all hands until we could get way on and get clear. The cause of this explosion is not known; but it is the opinion of the Commanding Officer that possibly one of our own torpedoes sank and exploded at considerable depth near the ship. It could hardly have been caused by any enemy action; for had they sighted us prior to firing, they would undoubtedly have been on us when the ship lost way. Yet it is impossible to believe that it was caused by a torpedo hit on the target as a torpedo exploding at that range would not have had such an effect on the submarine.
- One of the lookouts who had the target in sight at this time saw a geyser of water go up to about the height of the bridge, and the target was seen to slow or stop and fall behind the other ships of the convoy.
- 2330 (I) Two flashes followed by muffled explosions were seen on the target. It is believed the target was definitely hit, and there is a possibility that she sank, as during subsequent tracking it was determined that she was missing from the convoy although both escorts were still present.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2332 (I) Commenced reload, and continued tracking convoy, which appeared to be zig-zagging radically.

August 7

0250 (I) After having experienced much difficulty in determining our position relative to the convoy, and their new course and speed, decided to get ahead on the convoy base course for a submerged attack at dawn. While I realized that the convoy might make a radical change of course at daylight, all hands were by this time so fatigued from so long a chase that another night surface attack appeared to offer very little prospect of success. Tracked convoy out to a range of 18,000 yards by radar on a constant bearing of 340⁰T, and at
0427 (I) Dived and headed on reverse of convoy course. Convoy not again sighted.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	2	3
Time	0850	1036
Date	8/6	8/6
Position	29-03N 141-12E	29-10N 141-00E
Type	2 - 5000 T. AK's	1 - 7000 T. AK 2 - 5000 T. AK's 1 - DE 1 - Pc
Int. Range	12,000	20,000
Course &	000 ⁰ T	210 ⁰ T
Speed	8 kts	10 kts
How Contacted	P	SD
Remarks	Out of range surfaced and gave chase.	Sighted while chasing contact 2 (above) 7,00 ton AK similar to Amagisan Maru. Other two AK's not identified. appeared to be fairly new ship with single stack and destroyer 11 made attacks 1 & 2 on,

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Paddle
First War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VIII, Case 2, No. C-1.

No. C-5

(For August 2 through 4, see VIII, Case 2, No. C-2.)

August 6

1025 (I) Submerged to routine all torpedoes.
1330 (I) Surfaced and continued one engine speed patrol on course for area.

August 7

0500 (I) Changed course to 111 T. Sea building up during the morning from the east. Heavy swells at 1200 (I).
1225 (I) Increased to two engine propulsion because of heavy seas.
1300 (I) Position 27-41N, 137-14E. Sighted ship by #1 periscope on horizon bearing 072 T.
1303 (I) Ship in sight determined to be a submarine.
1304 (I) Submerged and closed track on northerly course.
1326 (I) It is a U.S. Submarine on a westerly course.
1328 (I) Opened range on course 180 T.
1404 (I) Surfaced. Submarine in sight only from #1 periscope. Set course 106 T.
1909 (I) Commenced search on base course 353 T.

August 8

Wind increased during morning. Moderately heavy sea by late afternoon. Visibility remained good although sky usually overcast.
1745 (I) Changed to course north.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: See VIII, Case 1, No. C-4.

No. C-7

August 4

Made daily training dives in period July 29 and August 4. Submerged half a day August 2 and all day August 3. Noted S.J. radar interference at 0150(L) on August 3. S. J. contacts were reported several times during night periods. These looked like real contacts but faded and usually the OOD could see a rain squall in the direction of the contact.

0606 (L)

Submerged.

0745 (L)

Sound reported pinging on 026T, could see nothing through periscope.

1037 (L)

Sighted masts bearing 324 T, distant about 5 miles. As contact developed found masts belonged to a "killer" type patrol vessel steering various courses and not pinging. Avoided her.

1300 (L)

Went deep to check for temperature inversion and found a 4 drop at about 270 feet.

1415 (L)

Sound reported 8 sets of screws making 216 RPM. Went to battle stations and planed up. Could find nothing with a high periscope exposure. Contact must have been a school of fish.

2025 (L)

Surfaced in a very dark and rainy night. Commenced a surface patrol between ULUL ISLAND and MOGAMI BANK at 1/3 speed.

2355 (L)

While on course 320T had a S.J. contact bearing 039 T, range 10,800 yards. Sound picked up this target about the same time. Went to battle stations and commenced tracking.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 3, No. C-7 (Cont.)

August 5

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-5.

August 10

During period 5 - 10 August conducted a high periscope patrol during daylight and a surface patrol at night across SAIPAN - TRUK traffic lanes.

No. C-8

Description of Contact

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-6.

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

(Tarawa Base
Force 23)

01/0927 August
30897

(Air Flot 22)
(Base Force 6)
(Maru)

INFO:

(Yokosuka Local Trans. Section)
(CofS Yokosuka)

First part of message missing.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 4, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Noon positions:

1st, 07-(30?)N, 152-08E.
2nd, 07-11N, 154-58E.
3rd, 07-16N, 157-46E.
4th, 07-42N, 160-(34?)E.
5th, 08-07N, 163-22E.
6th, 08-35N, 166-10E.

2. _____ turns off from convoy at noon on
3rd.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0330 (-9)
2nd.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 02/0723 August
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OP OP

WORK FOR RUTTER* X ULTRA X CONVOY X BLANK X
BLANK X MINUS 900 (0300) X MINUS 11 (AUGUST
4) X DKQM 4234 (07-42 NORTH 160-34 EAST) POSI-
TIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE AS
FOLLOWS: HNVH 0722 (08-07 NORTH 163-22 EAST)
HNAS 3510 (08-35 NORTH 166-10 EAST) X COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 12

* CO OF SEADRAGON

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 4 (Cont.)

C. - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seadragon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was good and complete
in all Areas. No casualties.

No. C-2

August 4

1004 (L) Sighted plane, distance 14 miles. Dived.
1055 (L) Surfaced.
1525 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 260° T.
1604 (L) Sighted plane, distance 10 miles. Dived.
Headed over to get smoke bearing 270° T.
1814 (L) Made out target as a four ship convoy with
Contact #4 one torpedo boat escort. Three medium
Attack #3 sized AKs and one AP in two columns on
base course 265°, zig-zagging independently,
escort trailing between the two columns.
1920 (L) Fired two torpedoes from after tubes at
leading AK in starboard column. Track
95° S, range 1900 yards.
1922 (L) One hit forward, explosion was not very
loud sounded like another low order de-
tonation. Big column of smoke came out
of target's forward hatch, target stopped.
There was much blowing of whistles and
flashing of red lights on forward yardarms
of other ships in convoy.
1926 (L) Went deep as torpedo boat acted as if he had
located us.
1928 (L) First depth charge. We again found a
density layer at 170 feet and found it very
convenient to hide under. Between 1928 and
1937 escort dropped a total of eight charges,
all were deep and the heaviest we have ever
experienced.

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 2031 (L) Started up to periscope depth. Sound picked up screws of escort overhead and heavy screws making about twenty turns. Heard the heavy screws for about five minutes and then they stopped and were not heard again.
- 2050 (L) Went deep as sound reported escort's screws getting close.
- 2158 (L) Surfaced and commenced radar search of the area.
- 2330 (L) Unable to pick up anything. Took up base course of convoy and went to full speed on four engines.

August 5

- 0007 (L) Contact on radar, 15,800 yards. Contact developed into two AKs in column. As it was too light to make a surface attack and no moon, decided to make a periscope attack at daylight. Continued tracking during the night and worked up to a position dead ahead on their base course.
- 0521 (L) Dived.
- 0620 (L) Targets in sight.
- 0710 (L) Sighted AP and escort broad on the beam, range 9,000 yards.
- 0728 (L) When range reached 4,000 yards, targets changed course and headed for AP and escort. Broke off attack, range too great for high speed shot and sea was too smooth for a successful long range shot.
- 0735 (L) Sighted twin float monoplane over convoy. Formation order consisted of two AKs in line abreast with AP astern of one and the escort astern of the other, on base course 085°T. Our target of last night not present.
- 1127 (L) Surfaced.
- 1205 (L) Sighted plane and smoke from convoy. Started working around to get in position for attack.
- 1752 (L) Lost contact, headed South. Unable to gain contact, searched all night.

August 6

Still unable to regain contact took position on what was estimated as the convoy base course.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0725 (L) Sighted twin float monoplane bearing 245°, closing. Dived.

0822 (L) Sighted masts of convoy bearing 250° T.

1122 (L) Convoy passed to South of us. Minimum range 6,500 yards. Ships were in the same formation as yesterday, with plane searching ahead. Decided to trail instead of getting ahead, and make an attack at night or else.

1250 (L) Surfaced.

1514 (L) Dived. Plane escorting convoy seemed to be getting closer, although he was too low or too far away for the radar to pick up.

1546 (L) Surfaced. Continued Trailing.

1805 (L) Plane left the convoy, went to full speed.

2120 (L) Radar contact bearing 320°T., range 16,000 yards. There were rain squalls all around the horizon and considerable lightning. Decided to attack from convoy's starboard bow. Ships appeared to be in a line of bearing on base course 080°T., with line of bearing running 150°- 330°T., speed nine knots. There were two small pips which were assumed to be escorts on the starboard quarter of the formation. Ships were about 1,500 yards apart.

2241 (L) When range on target reached 7,000 yards a flash of lightning lit up the whole scene. We were sighted. One of the escorts headed for us, changed course to South to open out. Convoy increased speed to 12 knts. and scattered. After opening range to 10,000 yards, came around to take position on starboard quarter of nearest ship and wait until the convoy had settled down.

2304 (L) Convoy had appeared to settle down, slowing speed again to 9 knots and regained their previous general positions. Commenced approach on the last ship on the starboard flank.

2324 (L) On reaching a range of 6,000 yards another flash of lightning lit up the scene and again we were sighted. One escort turned back and headed for us. Reversed course and opened

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946.

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

range, decided to try attack from port flank although this side gave us a lighter background.

August 7

0014 (L)

While crossing astern of convoy, radar made a contact, range 2,500 yards dead ahead. Reversed course and went to full speed. Radar kept this contact for about a minute and a half and then it disappeared, nothing sighted from the bridge. Came around to make another try at the port flank of the convoy. At this time it was decided to get all three ships in as near a line as possible and fire four bow and two stern (all we had aft) shots at low speed. There was only 2,000 yards intervals between the ship on the left flank and those on the right flank, the idea being, if we missed our target there would be a possibility of hitting one of the other two. Because of the frequent lightning we had no hopes of getting in very close to our target. This would be our last chance at the convoy as we then were twelve miles from KWAJALEIN.

0159 (L)

Had all ships on a line of bearing, the two furthest ones appeared to almost overlap. Waited until our target which turned out to be the AP, zigged left, giving us a track of 110°P. Fired forward tubes, range 2,600 yards, then came around. While we were swinging target zigged to the right giving a track of 170°P.

0203 (L)

Three hits on the two other ships which were the AKs. From the time interval, as recorded by sound, it appeared that the nearest and further aft AK received 2 hits and the other, one hit. From the bridge, could only make out hit on each.

0204 (L)

Escorts started dropping depth charges, numerous explosions were heard up until 0221.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0205 (L) Came around astern of formation and opened range to 8,000 yards and stopped in order to see what was going on. We were much surprised at hitting the AKs, although we had hopes, in case we missed the AP. The radar range to the AKs increased to 10,000 and then remained stationary. The AP's radar range increased rapidly to 16,000 yards and then faded out.

0210 (L) The AK's radar range still remained steady at 10,000 yards. The escorts appeared to be milling around them to port.

0219 (L) One of the pips of the AK's slowly disappeared. Shortly after it disappeared sound reported an explosion.

0221 (L) The other AK pip disappeared and sound reported another explosion. Although these ships were not seen to sink, because of visibility, there is sufficient evidence from the radar data to show that they did.

0224 (L) Only pips left on the radar screen were the two small ones of the escorts, at a range of 9,500 yards. The range increased and finally faded out at 11,000 yards.

0507 (L) Dived. Commenced submerged patrol on KWAJALEIN-TRUK line, and to give the crew a little rest. Sighted many planes in the direction of KWAJALEIN during the day.

1855 (L) Surfaced.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	3
Time	1920.
Date	8/4
Lat.	7-04N
Long.	160-45E

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 4, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Ships Damaged	One 5,000 ton freighter
Ship(s) Probably sunk	Two 5,000 MPM freighters
Course	085
Speed	8.5
Range	2,600 (at firing)
Description	Sighted smoke from bridge. Four ship convoy and escort consisting of three MPM coal burning freighters, 5,000 tons, One KFK passenger-freighter of 6,000 tons and one OTORI Torpedo Boat. Visibility good.

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	31/2007 July
TO:	(Resident Naval Officer Takao) 35061 (Resident Naval Officer Keelung) (Resident Naval Officer Taihoku)

"From Chief of Staff Combined Fleet.
"blank ki" #1 according to word from the convoy
which was being escorted by blank in Posit 12-40
North, 113-30 East on July 29, blank great damage
blank. That ship's movements are as follows:
0400 August 1 in 20-00 North, 120-blank blank East,
course 86 degrees; 2000 August 1 in 20-13 North,
123-14 East, course 60 degrees; 1320 August 3 in
23-50 North, 130-00 East, course 40 degrees; 0900
August 4 in 26-44 North, 132-30 East, course 0 de-
grees; 0800 August 5 in 31-20 North, 132-30 East.

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 5, No. A-1 (Cont.)

At 1200 August 7 arrive Kure. With regard to blank, on the bridge is (painted) "Ro 500", and below that blank top deck blank width blank 1 blank 2 blank 2 white stripes blank with Japanese submarine."

BAKER COMMENT: Suggest this may be a damaged submarine.

GI COMMENT: Essentially same information received in NSS 011934 August. NEGAT suggests sub is of German or Italian nationality. "Akira" is a term applied to blockade-running German or Italian subs (NSS 141852 July). Akira #1 arrived Singapore July 13, ComSubPacFor informed of NEGAT's version at 0800(-9) August 2.

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

31/2007 July

35061

(Takao Resident Naval Officer)
(Keelung Resident Naval Officer)

From CinCCombined Fleet.
In position 12-40N, 113-30E on the 29th, the "Blank Ki" #1 was fired on by one of the ships in the convoy being escorted by blank. Fortunately, no damage

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 5, No. A-2 (Cont.)

was inflicted. Please have all activities concerned exercise the utmost caution in this connection. The above mentioned ship's positions and course are as follows:

1st, 0400, 20N, 120-blank E, course 86 degrees.
1st, 2000, 20-13N, 123-14 E, course 60.
3rd, 1320, 23-50N, 130-00 E, course 40 degrees.
4th, 0900, 26-44N, 132-30 E, course due north.
5th, 0800, 31-20N, 132-30 E.
7th, 1000 arrive Kure.

As recognition mark RO 500 has been painted on the bridge and under it blank. 2 white stripes, a meter wide, have been painted on deck. This ship is to be treated in the same manner as are Japanese submarines.

NEGAT COMMENT: Text gives impression subject vessel is a submarine of German or Italian nationality. Unable to clear descriptive kana for "Blank K1 #1."

GI COMMENT: "Akira" apparently means German or Italian blockade running submarines (Akira) #1 arrived Singapore July 13th. ComSubPacFor informed at 0800 (-9) Aug. 2nd.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PADDLE
ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX

02/0834 August

PREC: OP OP OP

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 5, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA X SERIAL 11 X GERMAN SPRUCE (SUBMARINE) X
1200 (0000) X BLANK X MINUS 1200 X MINUS 11 X
LGCT 4430 (26 DEG 44 MIN NORTH) (132 DEG 30 MIN
EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 1100 X MINUS 11 X
TSGT 2030 (31 DEG 20 MIN NORTH) (132 DEG 30 MIN
EAST) X CARRIES MARKING R0500 X NOTE THAT SAIL-
FISH AND SCULPIN FOLLOWING STANDARD ROUTING WEST-
WARD TO 11B AND C RESPECTIVELY ARE SCHEDULED CROSS
GT (132 DEG EAST) ABOUT 6 AUGUST X

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PADDLE
ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP

04/0840 August

MORE DOFS FOB X ULTRA FOR PADDLE FROM COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 21 X SPRUCE (SUBMARINE) IN MY SERIAL 11
WILL BE MET BY LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) AT SAME TIME
AND PLACE X BRASS HAT ORDERED

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Paddle

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was generally good
and complete.

No. C-2

(For August 2 through 4, see VIII, Case 2,
No. C-2.)

(On August 5, the Paddle traveled on auxiliary
engine at slow speed to save fuel. Ed. Note.)

(For August 6 through 7, see VIII, Case 3,
No. C-5.)

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 01/0118 August
TO: (Southeast Area Fleet) 96150

INFO:

"From ComDesDiv 17. The Isokaze (escorting -unident vessel) and Kyokuto Maru will depart PT at 0500, 3rd August. She will cease escorting at 0500, 4th, August in position 09-40 North, 147-34 East, and rendezvous with the Main Body about 1000."

CI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1115 (-9) August 2. Plot indicated Isokaze will meet Main Body on "Route #1" at 10-50 North, 146-22 East at 1000 (-9) August 4th.

B- Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 02/1024 August
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP OP

ULTRA FOR TULLIBER POCY AND STEELHEAD GOES COM-SUBPAC SERIAL 14 X SHIP LISTED ON PAGE 264 ONI 208-J PLUS SHIP LISTED ON PAGE 76 ONI 14 DEPARTS THUK X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 800 MINUS 13 X

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 6, No. B-1 (Cont.)

POSITION AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY IS AS FOL-
LOWS: JDED 4024 (09-40 NORTH 147-34 EAST) X THESE
MAY PASS CLOSE TO ONE OF YOU X LET THEM HAVE SOME
TORPEX IF SITUATION LOOKS GOOD X THIS IS SECONDARY
TARGET BUT DON'T PASS UP ANY GOOD CHANCE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was satisfactory. Attempts
to jam Fox caused no difficulty.

No. C-2

(No entry from July 29 until August 4. No
contacts with Ultra target after that
date. Ed. Note.)

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio reception complete with no
difficulty experienced in copying
NFM on high frequency.

No. C-4

August 2

2035 (L) Due to fuel situation set course for Johnston
Island - sent dispatch to Comsubpac.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-4 (Cont.)

August 4

0735 Set course 270° True for position on Empire-Truk routes.

August 5

Surface and submerged patrol on Empire-Truk routes.

August 7-11

Enroute Johnston Island.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: In general - satisfactory ----- no difficulty experienced in copying submarine schedule. Transmissions carried out without difficulty on 8470ks. Missed Serial 25 of early July.

No. C-6

August 3

0403 (L)

During morning twilight at Latitude 9°-25' N. Longitude 152°-39' E. sighted what at first appeared to be a bright star on the horizon. It appeared to come closer, however, and just as we made it out to be a plane showing running lights and a searchlight, it fired a green rocket, and we dove. No bombs were dropped and as it was still dark we were not sure that we were seen. Decided to make another sweep in the vicinity of ULUL ISLAND before leaving area and headed in that direction. At

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-6 (Cont.)

August 4

1252 (L) Latitude 08°-42' N. Longitude 151°-26' E.
Sighted EAST FAYU ISLAND bearing 222° T.
distance eight miles and passed it abeam
to starboard. Obtained land fix. At
1906 (L) Latitude 08°-30' N. Longitude 151°-26' E.
Surfaced and headed westward, south of
NAMONUITO ISLAND ATOLL.

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

(For the Japanese dispatch on the Mingo's first
objective, see VIII, Case 2, A-1.
For the other intelligence, the intercepted Japa-
nese dispatch is not available. Ed.Note.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 03/0957 August
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP OP

ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC SERIAL 16 X TULLIBEE AND STEEL-
HEAD NOTE THAT POGY IS ENROUTE PEARL AND WILL NOT
BE PRESENT FOR PARTY YOU ARE GIVING NIGHT OF 4-5
AUGUST X WATCH OUT FOR POSSIBLE PLANE SEARCHES IN
YOUR VICINITY ON THE 4TH AND NOTE FOLLOWING X 127
POPCORN JOINING LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X BLANK BLANK
0300 X 5TH X DKZL 1500 (7-15 N 149-00 E) AND ARRIVES
SOUTH ENTRANCE 18 HOURS LATER X FOLLOWING FOR MINGO
X PECAN (CONVOY) X BLANK X BLANK X 0300 X 6TH X MWZG
3545 (14-35 N 133-45 E) ALGARROBA VXGT 0045 (12-00 N
132-45 E) JDGT 3530 (9-35 N 132-30 E) PASSES THROUGH

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 7, No. B-1 (Cont.)

NZGT (10 N 132 E) BETWEEN LAST 2 POSITIONS X IN
CASE YOU ARE HEADING HOME BECAUSE OF FUEL SHORT-
AGE YOU MIGHT TRY FOLLOWING ENROUTE X EMPTY
BIRCH (TANKER) X BLANK X SPEED 14.5 KNOTS X 0300
X 4TH CTWA 1040 (11-10 N 146-40 E) AND BLANK
14.5 KNOTS 0300 X 7TH RVGT 1020 (15-10 N 132-20 E)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VIII, Case 1, No. C-1.

No. C-2

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-2.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-3.

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VIII, Case 1, No. C-4.

No. C-5

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-5.

No. C-6

Description of Contact

See VIII, Case 1, No. C-6.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 7 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Radio reception satisfactory....
no serials were missed.

No. C-8

August 4-5

Left area, headed north for possible contacts near latitude 15N.

August 6

- 0752 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 345 degrees T. (Contact #4). Came to normal approach course at high speed until bearing steadied down on 353 degrees T., then headed in until we could see masts stacks, and at--
- 0900 (I) Submerged, commenced approach on convoy consisting of three freighters and one Wakatake class Destroyer. Made approach on largest freighter (Mito Maru class) which was leading the Maya Maru class freighter in the port column. The starboard column consisted of one Taisyo or Nagisan Maru class freighter. The destroyer was ahead and between the columns, and was not echo ranging.
- 1029 (I)Fired three torpedoes from stern nest at Mito Maru class freighter; then shifted to Maya Maru and fired fourth torpedo (Attack #3).
Unobserved attack.
Heard all torpedoes run and tracked them to the targets.....
- 1032 (I) After this all three ships were observed to be turning away, as the destroyer turned toward our flank.....Went deep and rigged for depth charge attack.....

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 7, No. C-8 (Cont.)

1115 (I) Came to periscope depth to look around
..... The Maya Maru was down by the stern
somewhat.....

1600 (I) Surfaced. Shortage of fuel prevented
chasing this convoy in a direction away
from our route to Midway. Headed north
for traffic focal point estimated to be
at 15N, and 133E to be there by dawn.

August 7

On station searching until noon, then set
course for Midway.....

August 8

0520 (I) Sighted smoke apparently headed north.....

0541 (I) Submerged. Made attempt to close at high
speeds (Contact #5).

0916 (I) Surfaced with smoke dead ahead bearing 045
degrees T. Commenced trailing at 12 knots
when bearing changed radically to westward
and shortly afterward masts and superstruc-
tures of six trawler type patrol vessels
came above the horizon rapidly..... They
patrolled back and forth and gradually moved
northward.

August 9

Noticed radar interference on SD-possible
plane.

August 10

0430 (I) Sighted Agrihan Islands, 26 miles distant.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 7 (Cont.)

No. C-9

Description of Contact

No.	4
Time	0752 (I)
Date	8/6
Position	13-44N 133-22E
Type	3 freighters, 1 destroyer
How contacted	Sighted smoke
Description	Convoy - three freighters, one destroyer (<u>Wakatake</u> class) At- tacked one <u>Mito Maru</u> class and one <u>Maya Maru</u> class. Sighted smoke. Excellent visibility.
Remarks	Convoy - one <u>Wakatake</u> class destroyer, one <u>Mito Maru</u> class, one <u>Maya Maru</u> class and one <u>Taisyo</u> or <u>Nagisan Maru</u> type freighter. (Attack #3)

No.	5
Time	0520 (I)
Date	8/8
Position	15-30N 137-22E
Type	6 patrol Vessels
How contacted	Sighted smoke
Remarks	Six patrol vessels - trawler type, searching our daylight position.

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	Unknown originator	03/1908 August
TO:	(Combined Fleet)	
	(Unident)	07475
	(Unident)	

ORIGINAL

15 January 1946

Case 8, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (Unident)
(Yokosuka Naval District Commander)
(Unident)
(1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Unident)
(Unident)
(Yokosuka Air Arsenal #2)
(Unident)
(Unident)
(Chichijima Special Base Force)
(Unident)

"From Captain of Otaka

Part 1. Otaka escorted by Onami (will depart PT at 0315 on the 4th. Scheduled to arrive Yokosuka at 1700 on the 9th.

Part 2. Course: 4th at 1640 08-48N, 155-0E.
6th at 1200 20-37N, 153-47E.
7th at 1700 33-05N, 145-47E.

Thence on course 290°, speed 18 knots.

Part 3. Request special arrangements be made with respect to planes and screening vessels from the early morning of the 9th. (Position at 0500 on the 9th will be 34-10 N 141-50 E.

Part 4. Passengers: 61 warrant officer and above,
294 petty officers, 76 laborers.
Total 431.

Cargo: 3 type 0 fighters, 3 shipboard
attack planes, 1 float fighter
plane, 5 engines, et cetera.

GI COMMENT: Subs were informed from HYPO copy.

No. A-2

FROM: Blank orizinator. 03/1908 August
TO: (Combined Fleet) 07475
(B)

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8, No. A-2 (Cont.)

(2nd Fleet) (B)

(Naval District CofS
Yokosuka) (B)
(Naval General Section
Vice Minister Vice
Chief) (B)

(Air Arsenal 2 Yokosuka) (B)

(Base Force 4 Truk) (B)
(Special Base Force
Chichijima) (B)

*Originator: C.O. Otaka

1. Otaka [escorted by Onami]
will depart Truk 0315 on the 4th, will arrive
Yokosuka 1700 on 9th.

2. Route:

4th, 1640, 8-48N, 155-00E.

6th, 1200, 20-37N, 153-47E.

7th, 1700, 33-05N, 145-47E.

Blank course 290 degrees?. Basic speed 18 knots.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: POGY
ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: WHALE
PIKE
CINCPAC

03/1832 August

PREC: OP OP OP

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8, No. B-1

IN A HURRY TO POGY X ULTRA COMSUBPAC SERIAL 18
X 026 PEANUT X 18-20 KNOTS X 0740 GCT X 4 AUGUST
X (8-48 NORTH 155-00 EAST) X 18-20 KNOTS X 0300
GCT X 6 AUGUST X (20-37 NORTH 153-47 EAST) X
LATITUDE FOR SECOND POSITION GIVEN IS SOMEWHAT
DOUBTFUL X PIKE AND WHALE NOTE X IMPORTANT

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC 03/2347 August
TO: POGY
PIKE
WHALE
ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP OP

ULTRA SERIAL 19 X 026 PEANUT X 18 TO 20 KNOTS X
0740 X 4TH AUGUST X (8-48 N 155-00 E) X 0300 X
6TH AUGUST X (20-37 N 153-47 E) X 0800 AUGUST X
(33-05 N 145-47 E) X SUBS CONCERNED CHANGE MY
SERIAL 18 TO CORRESPOND WITH ABOVE X WE NEED THIS
ONE BADLY X IF ANYONE STOPS OR SLOWS HIM DOWN
OPEN UP AND LET US KNOW

REF: SERIAL 18 X 026 PEANUT X 18-20
KNOTS X 0740 GCT X 4 AUGUST X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Poey

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete with
no difficulty experienced in
copying NPM on high frequency.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8 (Cont.)

No. C-2

August 2

2035 (K) Due to fuel situation set course for Johnston Island. Sent dispatch to Comsubpac.

August 4

0735 (K) Set course 270° True for position on Empire-Truk routes.

August 5

Surface and submerged patrol on Empire-Truk routes.

August 6

0020 (K) Set course for Johnston Island. Sent dispatch to Comsubpac.

August 7-14

Enroute Johnston Island.

U.S.S. Pike

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Reception was generally good on higher frequencies.
frequencies

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8 (Cont.)

No. C-4

August 6

- 0607 (K) Submerged. Proceeding at 3 knots submerged. Unable to fix position since leaving Marcus due to overcast sky.
- 0738 (K) Broached with conning tower hatch clear of water to obtain sun line for verifying longitude. Changed course to 180° T.
- 1308 (K) Sighted Japanese converted aircraft carrier of KASUGA class escorted by one FUBUKI class destroyer bearing 180°T, distance approximately 16,000 yards, steering in northerly direction.
- 1315 (K) Went to battle stations. Commenced submerged approach. Target making high speed, 20-22 knots, zig zagging radically.
- 1350 (K) Rigged ship for depth charge attack. Made ready bow and deck tubes. Planned to fire deck tubes on MK 8 angle solver bearings, bow tubes with TDC, white light method.
- 1356 (K) Fired #7 deck tube on incorrect firing bearing. Shifted immediately to bow tubes and fired 4 torpedoes by "white light method" followed by #8 deck tube on a MK 8 angle solver firing bearing. Firing range 2,200 yards. Lat. 21-03 N, Long. 153-31 E.
- 1357½ (K) Heard two distinct explosions 14 second apart. (Some personnel reported hearing a third explosion about 30 seconds after the first one.)
Heavy firing from guns of carrier directed at periscope. Shells exploding very close. Made ready stern tubes.
Destroyer observed on the port beam heading for periscope at high speed, range 1,700 yards. Ordered deep submergence (240 feet).
First depth charges went off on port quarter, estimated range 400 yards.
- 1400 (K) Rigged ship for silent running. Encountered heavy density layer at 170 feet; had to flood in 8,000 lbs. to get down to 240 feet.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8, No. C-4 (Cont.)

Destroyer made three attacks, dropping 4, 5, and 3 charges per attack respectively. The last attack was closest, about 200 yards.

1540 (K) Sound lost contact with destroyer after passing through heavy density layer. Came to periscope depth. No ships in sight. Went ahead with reloading forward torpedo tubes and investigating noise in starboard shaft which had developed during depth charge attack. Found nothing wrong and noise disappeared.

1726 (K) Surfaced. Set course 330°T at maximum cruising speed, recharging battery. Transmitting PIKE despatch 060836. Ran into heavy rain squall. Visibility reduced to one half mile at times.

2028 (K) Completed transmission, changed course to 298° T.

2200 (K) Weather cleared.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

No.	5
Time	1308 (K)
Date	8/6
Position	21-04N 153-31E
Types	ACV DD
Init. Range	8 mi.
Est. Cour.	
Speed	Base 000° 21 kts.
How contact	P
Remarks	Japanese. Converted aircraft carrier, KASUGA class. Destroyer escort, FUBUKI class. Carrier damaged in attack #2.

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

Case 8 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Whale

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: Radio reception Normal.

No. C-7

August 4-5

Commenced crossing known Tokyo-Truk shipping lanes so spent 2 days patrolling east and west on surface. Stormy weather - heavy seas - poor visibility.

August 5

Heavy seas.

August 6

Plane contact. Headed for point 120 mi. southeast of Ogasawara Gunto (about 30 N. 145 E.)

August 7

Sighted Minami Shima Retto bearing north. Headed SSE on route to Saipan.